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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS,
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST,
Cross-Appellants,

Case No. 000301127

vs.
GLEN E. MILLER,
Cross-Appellee.

BRIEF OF CROSS-APPELLANT
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction of this matter pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a3(2)0).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue 1
WHETHER THE REAL PROPERTY LOCATED AT 358 NORTH
100 EAST, TOOELE, UTAH QUALIFIED FOR HOMESTEAD
EXEMPTION ON MARCH 26,2001 WHEN A JUDICIAL LIEN
SEIZED THE PROPERTY.
(ADDENDUM 8, PAGE 19, LINE 25 AND PAGE 20, LINES 1-18)
1

Issue 2
WHETHER THE DECLARATION OF HOMESTEAD FILED ON
MARCH 27, 2003 NULLIFIED THE JUDICIAL LIEN ORDERED AGAINST
THE REAL PROPERTY LOCATED AT 358 NORTH 100 EAST, TOOELE,
UTAH ON MARCH 26,2001.
(ADDENDUM 8, PAGE 19, LINE 25; PAGE 20, LINES 1-20;
PAGE 22, LINES 8-13)
Standard of Review: The standard of review of the above stated issues is for correctness,
granting no deference to the trial judge's legal determinations. Meadowbrook. LLC v. Flower, 959
P.2d 115 (Utah 1998).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The cross-appellee was originally sued, civilly, for fraud. (Jerry Houghton, et al v. Glen E.
Miller, Third District Court, Tooele County, Case No. 000301127) He later pled guilty, in criminal
court, to eleven (11) counts of criminal fraud. (State of Utah vs. Glen E. Miller, Third District Court,
Salt Lake County, Case No. 001200550) (See Addendum 8, Page 18, Lines 1-4) In the above
entitled civil case, a prejudgment Writ of Attachment was ordered by the court on March 26,2001
(See Addendum 2), and it was recorded in the Tooele County Recorder's Office on June 15,2001.
(See Addendum 4)
On March 27,2003, the cross-appellee's wife recorded a document entitled Declaration of
Homestead. (See Addendum 5) The trial court rendered judgment against the cross-appellee on

2

April 10, 2003 for $271,398.00. (See Addendum 6)
Cross-appellants contend that the judicial lien, the prejudgment Writ of Attachment, ordered
by the trial court and recorded on June 15, 2001, cannot be defeated by the cross-appellee
subsequently selecting the property as his "then" homestead on or about March 27,2003, some two
years after the attachment lien seized the property. (See Addendums 2 and 3.)
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

In November of 2000, the cross-appellee, Glen E. Miller, was sued by the cross-

appellants for fraud. (See Addendum 1)
2.

The cross-appellee owned several parcels of real property, in particular "Parcel 3"

as identified in Addendum 2. The street address of Parcel 3 is 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah.
3.

On March 26, 2001, as an integral part of the ongoing civil case against the cross-

appellee, the Third District Court in and for Tooele County ordered a prejudgment Writ of
Attachment, pursuant to Rule 64C (a) (6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, against "Parcel 3".
(See Addendum 2)
4.

The prejudgment Writ of Attachment was actually signed by the Clerk of the Third

District Court on April 17, 2001. (See Addendum 3)
5.

On June 15,2001, the judicially ordered and signed prejudgment Writ of Attachment

Order was recorded in the Tooele County Recorder's Office at Book 687 and Page 21 with
Recording Number 164906. (See Addendum 4)
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6.

On March 26, 2001, when the prejudgment Writ of Attachment was ordered and

shortly thereafter recorded, the cross-appellee was not living at or using the old house at 358 North
100 East, Tooele, Utah as his "primary personal residence." The old house was then uninhabitable
and provided no shelter or income. (See Addendum 8, Page 14, Lines 6-16; and Addendum 11,
"Findings" at Paragraph 10.) In fact, on March 26,2001, cross-appellee's and his family's "primary
personal residence" was 891 Upland Drive, Tooele, Utah. (See Addendum 11, "Findings" at
Paragraphs 6 and 7)
7.

The cross-appellees's primary residence at 891 Upland Drive, Tooele, Utah was

foreclosed upon in December of 2002. (See Addendum 11, "Findings" at Paragraph 9.) In the early
part of 2003, Mrs. Miller began to make repairs to the old house at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah
in preparation of moving in. She did move in approximately March or May of 2003. (See
Addendum 11, "Findings" at Paragraph 8.) Cross-appellee was previously sentenced to the Utah
State Prison on or about March 27, 2002. (See Addendum 8, Page 21, Line 17-23 and Addendum
11 at Paragraph 8.)
8.

On March 27, 2003, Mrs. Miller filed a "Declaration of Homestead" against 358

North 100 East, Tooele, Utah. (See Addendum 5.)
9.

On April 10, 2003, the Third District Court entered a Judgment against the cross-

appellee in the amount of $271,398.00. (See Addendum 6.)
10.

On May 1, 2003, in connection with the prejudgment Writ of Attachment ordered
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March 26,2001, the Third District Court issued a Writ of Execution and a Praecipe against the house
located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah, ordering a sheriff's sale toward satisfying the crossappellant's judgment (See Addendum 7.)
11.

Cross-appellee opposed the sheriff s sale because his wife had subsequently moved

into the house and filed a "Declaration of Homestead" on March 27,2003. A hearing was held on
August 4, 2003. (See Addendum 8, Transcript.) The trial court ruled that cross-appellee and his
wife had a homestead exemption in the old house in the amount of $40,000.00, but would not stay
the sale of the house because its value exceeded the value of the alleged homestead exemption. (See
Addendum 8, Page 30, Line 17-22; Addendum 10, Page 14, Line 9-14 and Page 22, Lines 6-8; and
Addendum 12)
12.

The trial court issued an order entitled "Order on Hearing on Writ of Execution

Granting Homestead Exemption" on December 4, 2003. The trial court set forth its ruling in the
Findings and Legal Conclusions. Paragraph 13 of the Legal Conclusions states as follows:
"The prejudgment Writ of Attachment, filed on March 26, 2001 is defeated
by the filing of a homestead declaration on March 26, 2003. " (See Addendum 11,
Paragraph 13.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The cross-appellants take exception to the legal "correctness" of the trial court's Order on
Hearing on Writ of Execution Granting Homestead Exemption at Paragraph 13; and as such, have
appealed the court's decision granting a homestead exemption after the judicial lien (prejudgment
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Writ of Attachment of March 26,2001) was ordered by the trial court. The cross-appellants further
contend that the old house at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah was not devoted to homestead use,
and therefore was non-exempt property at the time the judicial lien of March 26,2001 attached, and
that the subsequent change of status (Mrs. Miller doing repairs and moving in) cannot be used to
defeat an existing judicial lien at a time the property had no exempt status under the Utah
Exemptions Act.

ARGUMENT 1
WHETHER THE REAL PROPERTY LOCATED AT 358 NORTH
100 EAST, TOOELE, UTAH QUALIFIED FOR HOMESTEAD
EXEMPTION ON MARCH 26,2001 WHEN A JUDICIAL LIEN
SEIZED THE PROPERTY.
(ADDENDUM 8, PAGE 19, LINE 25 AND PAGE 20, LINES 1-18.)
The cross-appellants were in the process of suing the cross-appellee for fraud. (See
Addendum 8, Page 19, Line 25 and Page 20, Lines 1-18.) On March 26,2001, the cross-appellants
petitioned the trial court, pursuant to Rule 64C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, for a
prejudgment Writ of Attachment to seize certain real property owned by the cross-appellee, namely
an old uninhabited house located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah. After a hearing, the
prejudgment Writ of Attachment was ordered. (See Addendum 2). The Order and the Writ of
Attachment were prepared and signed by the judge on April 17,2001, and recorded in the Tooele
County Recorder's Office on June 15,2001. (See Addendums 3 and 4.)
At the time the prejudgment Writ of Attachment was ordered by the trial court seizing 358
6

North 100 East, Tooele, Utah, the cross-appellee's primary personal residence was 891 Upland
Drive, Tooele, Utah. He personally lived there with his wife and family and had done so for several
years. (See Addendum 11, Paragraphs 6 and 7.)
The Utah Exemption Act, as set forth in Section 78-23-4 et al, Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended, sets forth the right to claim a homestead exemption, but only after complying with the
statutory mandates.
The old uninhabited house located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah was not crossappellee's personal primary residence on March 26, 2001, pursuant to Section 78-23-3(2)(a)(ii),
which states as follows: (See Addendum 11, Paragraphs 6, 7, 8 and 10.)
"78-23-3(2)(a)(ii):
"An individual is entitled to "a " homestead exemption consisting of property
in this state in an amount not exceeding:
"(ii) $20,000 in value if the property claimed is the primary personal
residence of the individual "
"78-23-3 (2)(b)(ii):
"(ii)

for property exempt under Subsection (2) (a) (ii), the
maximum exemption may not exceed $40,000 per household. "

Primary personal residence is defined for homestead exemption purposes at Section 78-233(l)(a) as:
"Primary personal residence means a dwelling or mobile home land the land
surrounding it, not exceeding one acre, as in reasonable necessaryfor the use of the
dwelling or mobile home, in which the individual and the individual1s household
7

reside;..."
Residence has been defined for qualifying for a homestead exemption as follows:
"Residence means living or dwelling in a certain place permanently or for
a considerable length of time. It is the place where a man makes his home, or where
he dwells permanently, or for an extended period of time." Bonebrake v. Morrow,
190 SE Reporter 506 (1937)
"Household" is defined for qualifying for a homestead exemption pursuant to Section
78-23-3(l)(a) as follows:
"Household means a group of persons related by blood or marriage living
together in the same dwelling as an economic unit, sharing furnishings, facilities,
accommodations and expenses."
On March 26,2001, the old uninhabited house at 358 North 100 East in Tooele, Utah was
not cross-appellee's "primary personal residence," was not cross-appellee's "residence," and was not
cross-appellee's "household," pursuant to Section 78-23-3 of the Utah Code. Furthermore, it
provided no income or shelter to anyone. (See Addendum 11, and Addendum 8, Page 25, Lines 611.) Therefore, it is legally impossible for cross-appellee to claim 358 North 100 East as his
"homestead." As a matter of law, on March 26, 2001, when the Writ of Attachment was ordered
against 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah, the only property cross-appellee could claim as his
homestead was where he and his family were then living, which as 891 Upland Drive, Tooele, Utah.
(See Addendum 11, Paragraphs 6 and 7.) Therefore, the protections or exemptions set forth in
Section 78-23-3(3)(a)(b)(c) and (d) do not apply because they only apply in instances where the
specific property qualifies as a "homestead."
8

ARGUMENT 2
WHETHER THE DECLARATION OF HOMESTEAD FILED
ON MARCH 27,2003 NULLIFIED THE JUDICIAL LIEN ORDERED
AGAINST THE REAL PROPERTY LOCATED AT 358 NORTH
100 EAST, TOOELE, UTAH ON MARCH 26,2001.
(ADDENDUM 8, PAGE 19, LINE 25; PAGE 20, LINES 1-20;
PAGE 22, LINES 8-13)

In December of 2002, the primary personal residence at 891 Upland Drive, Tooele, Utah,
where the cross-appellee's family was living, was foreclosed upon. The family then moved to
another unknown location. (See Addendum 11, "Findings" at Paragraph 9.)
In the early part of 2003, almost two years after the Writ of Attachment was ordered by the
court, Mrs. Miller began to make repairs to the house located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah,
in preparation of moving in. (See Addendum 8, Page 22, Lines 7-13 and Addendum 11, "Findings"
at Paragraphs 6 through 10.) On March 27,2003, Mrs. Miller recorded a Declaration of Homestead
in the Tooele County Recorder's Office. (See Addendum 5.)
On April 10, 2003, the trial court entered judgment against cross-appellee for committing
fraud in the amount of $271,398.00. (See Addendum 6.) On May 1,2003, a Writ of Execution was
issued by the trial court, in conjunction with the prejudgment Writ of Attachment granted on March
26,2001. (See Addendum 7.)
The issue now becomes whether the cross-appellee can claim a homestead exemption in the
real property located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah in March of 2003, when he could not make
9

the same claim in March of 2001. It is the cross-appellant's contention that no homestead exemption
can be claimed in March of 2003 that will defeat the judicial lien ordered against the property in
March of 2001.
The trial court's ruling relies solely on Sanders v. Cassidv. 586 P.2d 423 (Utah 1978). (See
Addendum 9.) But the issue in Sanders is different than the issue in the case at bar.
Even the Sanders case distinguishes its ruling from this fundamental difference in Footnote
4 at Page 426, which states as follows:
"In the case before us, Dunham was qualified a head of the household and
was entitled to the exemption before the judgment lien was recorded.
"Furthermore, the language referred to above was taken from Evans v.
Jensen, a case where the owner was not entitled to a homestead exemption at the
time the lien attached. "
In this appeal, the homestead exemption did not previously exist before the Writ of
Attachment seized the property on March 26, 2001, and cannot be later created to defeat the prior
judicial lien.
The Utah State Supreme Court has ruled in Evans v. Jensen. 51 Utah 1; 168 P. 762 (Utah
1917), the following:
"Existing liens on property cannot be defeated by subsequently claiming said
property as a homestead"
"In Crosby v. Anderson. 49 Utah 167,162 P. 75, it is expressly held that nonexempt property may be converted into property which will be exempt, but the
conversion must be made at some time before not after a lien has attached. That
principle is especially applicable to homestead exemptions by the great weight of
10

authority. Nor, in ourjudgment, is there anything to the contrary in any of the cases
decided by this court. "
"The rule has been applied in cases of liens created by judgment, liens
created by levy of execution, liens created by attachment mechanics' liens and
materialmen's liens. " 40 C. J. S. 54
Counsel can find no exception to this rule.
Waples on Homestead and Exemption (1893), Pages 302-303, sets forth this law more
precisely as follows:
"Attachment Liens.
"(1) Claiming homestead after attachment: When the law
gives the right of attachment for debt, it gives also that of sale, to
complete the object: the satisfaction of the debt. Such right is, from
the time the lien attaches by seizure a vested right and property. In
this respect, there is no difference between a lien secured by a levy of
an attachment and one secured by the docketing of a Judgment, or the
levy of an execution,. . .This was said in deciding that an owner
cannot defeat an attachment lien by selecting the attached property
as his homestead after the seizure...
"Whether the debtor would be permitted to claim homestead
in realty specifically burdened by an attachment lien, when the
creditor has a vested right of lien on the particular property claimed,
is a different question; and a question that has been fully answered
by the decisions next cited. The answer is negative. ..
"When property, not exempt from execution, has been
attached, no subsequent action of the owner, such as claiming it as
a homestead, moving upon it making it the family home and
complying generally with the legal requisites for establishing a
homestead, will defeat the attachment lien. When the preliminary
seizure has been effected legally, it precludes homestead dedication
as effectually as levy after judgment could do so. "
11

CONCLUSION
The cross-appellants seek to have the Utah Court of Appeals reverse the trial court's
determination that the cross-appellee has a right to claim a homestead exemption on the real property
located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah. It is undisputed that the personal primary residence of
the cross-appellee on March 26,2001 was 891 Upland Drive, Tooele, Utah, not the old uninhabitable
house located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah, which offers no shelter or income to anyone.
The prejudgment Writ of Attachment, ordered by the trial court on March 26,2001, seized
the real property located at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah, at a time when the real property was
not "impressed" with a homestead and "...no subsequent action of the owner (cross-appellee), such
as claiming it as a homestead, moving upon it, making it the family home and complying generally
with the legal requisites for establishing a homestead, will defeat the attachment lien." Wapleson
Homestead and Exemptions (1893), Page 303.
WHEREFORE, the cross-appellee is not entitled, as a matter of law, to a homestead
exemption as to the real property located at 3 5 8 North 100 East, Tooele, Utah; and therefore, the trial
court's decision should be reversed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 19th day of November, 2004.

DOUGLAS/F. WHITE
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this 19 day of November, 2004,1 mailed, postage prepaid, a
two accurate copies of the foregoing Cross-Appellants' Brief to:
Glen E. Miller, USP No. 33042
Cross-Appellee
UTAH STATE PRISON
P. O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

4.M-
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Addendum 1

UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

MAR - * 20M
In the Third District Court of Tooele CountyState of U t a h
JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS,
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

INDEX OF RECORD ON APPEAL
District Ct. Case #000301127
Supreme Ct. Case #20040007CA

vs.
GLEN E. MILLER,
Defendant-Appellee.
Date
Filed

DOCUMENT

Page
Numbers

Complaint
1
Summons on Return
21
Motion to Issue Writ of Attachment Pursuant 23
to Rule 64 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure
12/05/00 Verified Affidavit of Kendall R. and
26
Marlene Thomas in Support of Motion to
Issue a Writ of Attachment
12/05/00 Verified Affidavit of Jerry and Susan
67
Houghton in Support of Motion to Issue a
Writ of Attachment
01/03/01 Answer
72
01/12/01 Amended Motion to Issue Writ of Attachment 83
Pursuant to Rule 64 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure
87
01/12/01 LIS PENDENS
02/05/01 Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to
89
Plaintiff's Amended Motion to Issue Writ of
Attachment Pursuant to Rule 64 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure
02/05/01 Defendant's Motion to Strike Plaintiff's
94
Affidavits in Support of Motion for Writ of
Attachment and for Costs and Attorney Fees
02/05/01 Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion 96
to Strike Plaintiff's Affidavits in Support
of Motion for Writ of Attachment and for
Costs and Attorney Fees
02/05/01 Affidavit of Residency of Glen E. Miller
103
02/23/01 Plaintiff's Reply to Defendant's
105
Memorandum Opposed to Motion for Writ of
Attachment
02/23/01 Supplemental Verified Affidavit of Jerry
108
Houghton, Susan Houghton, Kendall R.
Thomas and Marlene Thomas

11/15/00
12/01/00
12/05/00

20
22
25
66
71
-- 82
-- 86
-- 88
-- 93

- 95
102

104
107
- 109

Houghtons & Thomases V Miller Case #000301127
Date Filed
03/06/01
03/12/01
03/19/01
03/20/01
03/22/01
03/26/01
04/17/01
05/07/01
05/18/01
06/06/01
06/14/01
06/20/01
06/25/01
08/28/01
08/31/01
08/31/01
09/05/01
09/05/01
09/05/01
09/10/01
11/14/01
11/14/01
11/14/01
11/29/01
12/03/01
12/06/01
01/11/02
01/30/02
09/10/02
10/03/02
12/0 9/02
02/05/03
02/05/03
02/05/03

Document
Notice to Submit for Decision
Notice of Hrg/Writ of Attachment
Notice to Atty Atkin Returned
Notice to Submit for Decision
Reply to Defendants Notice to Submit
for Decision
Minutes - Hearing Writ of Attachment
Order on Motion for Prejudgment Writ of
Attachment
Request for Video
Entry of Appearance
Return on Writ of Attachment and Notice
of Writ of Attachment
Reply to Notice of Proceedings; and
Motion to Stay Proceedings
Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendants
Motion to Stay Proceedings
Notice of Stay of Proceedings; and
Motion to Stay Proceedings
Notice of Deposition
Subpoena on Return
Subpoena on Return
Subpoena on Return
Subpoena on Return
Subpoena on Return
Notice of Unavailability for Taking
Depositions
Objections to Subpoenas
Motion of Non-Party Movants to Quash or
Modify Subpoenas
Memorandum in Support of Non-Party Movants
Motion to Quash or Modify Subpoenas
Notice of Stay of Proceedings; and Motion
to Stay Proceedings
Notice of Stay of Proceedings; and Motion
to Stay Proceedings
Second Reply to Second Notice of Stay of
Proceedings; and Second Motion to Stay
Proceedings
Notice of Deposition
Amended Notice of Depositions
Notice of Court's Order to Show Cause
Minutes - Court's Order to Show Cause
Order on Order to Show Cause
Motion to Strike Discovery Cut Off Date
and Trial Date
Motion for Summary Judgment
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Summary
Judgment

Page 2
Page Number
110
112
114
118
121

-

111
113
117
120
125

126
127 - 129
130
131 - 132
133 - 146

147 - 149
150 - 153
154 - 167
167
171
178
185
192
199
206

-

170
177
184
191
198
205
207

208 - 210
211 - 213

214 - 274
275 - 290
2S1 - 306
307 - 308
309
312
315
318
320
322

-

311
314
317
319
321
355

356 - 357
358 - 390

Houghtons & Thomases V. Miller
Date Filed
02/21/03
02/27/03
02/28/03
03/24/03
04/18/03
04/18/03
04/28/03
06/12/03
06/17/03
06/26/03
07/18/03
07/22/03
07/22/03
07/23/03
07/25/03
07/28/03
08/04/03
08/07/03
08/08/03
08/18/03
08/29/03
09/02/03
09/02/03
09/02/03
09/04/03
09/04/03
09/16/03
09/17/03
09/18/03
09/19/03
09/19/03
09/19/03
09/24/03
10/02/03

10/03/03

Document

Case # 000301127

Page 3
Page Number

Opposition to Summary Judgment Motion
391 - 392
Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendant's
393 - 395
Opposition to Summary Judgment
Notice to Submit for Decision
396 - 397
Minute Entry Decision
398 - 399
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
400 - 404
Judgment
405 - 407
Notice of Withdrawal as Counsel
408 - 409
Request for Hearing, Notification of
410
Return on Writ of Execution
411 - 416
Notice of Hearing on Writ of Execution
417 - 418
Summary Motion to Stay Writ of Execution
419
Order for Stay of Execution
420
Request for Transportation to Attend Hrg
421
Transportation Order to Attend Scheduled Hrg 422
Motion to Set Aside Judgment
423 - 432
Affidavit of Defendant Glen E. Miller
433 - 436
Minutes - Oral Argument
437
Order Granting Homestead Exemption
43 8 - 441
Memorandum for Record
442 - 443
Request for Video
444
Memorandum for Record
445 - 454
Motion for Enlargement of Time to File
455 - 456
Written Objections to Proposed Order on
Motion to Set Aside Summary Judgment
Motion for Enlargement of Time to File
457 - 458
Written Objections to Proposed Order on
Motion to Determine Homestead Exemption
Letter from Glen Miller
459
Order Granting Motion for Enlargement of
460
Time
Order Granting Motion for Enlargement of
461
Time
Notice of Cancellation of Sheriff's Sale
462 - 463
Motion for Enlargement of Time to File
464 - 465
Written Objections
Affidavit of Facts Constituting Contempt
466 - 468
of Court
Letter from Atty Angerhofer to Inmate
469
Placement Program
Letter to the Judge from Glen E. Miller
470
Objections to Proposed Order on Motion to 471 - 475
Determine Homestead Exemption
Notice of Judgment Recorded in the
476 - 477
Registry of Judgments
Objections to Plaintiffs' Order on
478 - 479
Hearing on Writ of Execution Granting
Homestead Exemption and Defendant's
Proposed order
Letter to the Judge from Atty White
480

Houghtons & Thomases V. Miller
Date Filed
10/03/03
10/07/03
10/07/03

Case #000301127

Document

Page 4
Page Number

Notice to Submit for Decision and/or
481 - 482
Request for Oral Argument
Objections to Order to Set Aside Summary
483
Judgment
Notice to Submit for Decision and Judicial 484 - 493

Notice
10/09/03
10/14/03
10/14/03
10/27/03
11/17/03
11/19/03
12/03/03
12/04/03
12/04/03
12/05/03
12/11/03
12/12/03
12/15/03
12/18/03
12/23/03
12/29/03
02/30/03
01/06/04
01/08/04
01/13/04
01/13/04
01/16/04
01/22/04
02/17/04
02/24/04
02/27/04
03/01/04

Request for Judicial Notice of Homestead
494 - 495
Objection to Defendant's Proposed Order
496 - 497
on Writ of Execution Granting Homestead
Exemption
Request for Oral Argument
498 - 499
Notice of Oral Argument
500 - 502
Verified Affidavit of Glen E. Miller
503 - 506
Order of Transportation
507
Notice of Appearance of Counsel
508 - 509
Minutes - Oral Argument
510
Order on Hearing on Writ of Execution
511 - 516
Granting Homestead Exemption
Copy of Writ of Execution
517 - 520
Motion to Stay Order Pending Appeal
521 - 524
Notice of Appeal and Request for Waiver
525 - 527
of Fees
Ruling and Order
528 - 531
Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel
532 - 533
Letter from Glen E. Miller Requesting a
534 - 536
Transcript
Request for Hearing - Notification of
537
Exemption
Notice of Cross-Appeal
538 - 539
Return of Service on Writ of Execution
540 - 543
Letter from Utah Court of Appeals
544
Minute Entry
545 - 549
Minute Entry
550 - 551
Request for Transcripts
552 - 553
Letter from Utah Court of Appeals
554
Petition for Rule 65B Extraordinary Relief 555 - 574
Proof of Publication of Notice of Sheriff's
575
Sale of Real Property
Letter from Utah Court of Appeals
576
Order - Utah Court of Appeals
577
TRANSCRIPTS

01/30/04
01/30/04

Hearing Held December 4, 2003
Hearing Held August 4, 2003

578
579
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DOUGLAS F. WHITE, #3443
Attorney for Plaintiffs
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 652-0016
FAX: (801)296-1754

FILED

ClbfRICT COURT TOOELE

01 APR ( 7 AH 10; 1*8
FILED B Y .

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS,
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
))
)1
))

ORDER ON MOTION FOR
PREJUDGMENT WRIT OF
ATTACHMENT

]
]

GLEN E.MILLER,

]•
)

Civil No. 000301127
Judge David S. Young

Defendants.

The Plaintiffs' Motion for a Prejudgment Writ of Attachment came before the Court on the
26th day of March, 2001, before the Honorable David S. Young, Judge; the Plaintiffs were present
and represented by their attorney, Douglas F. White; the Defendant was not personally present, but
was represented by his attorney, Gregory P. Hawkins; the Court having reviewed the pleadings and
the evidence by proffer of the attorneys, and good cause appearing therefore, now enters the
following Order:
1.

The Plaintiffs' Motion for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment against the following

described parcels of real property is hereby granted:
1

Parcel No. 1- All of Lot 1, Oak View Heights #4, a subdivision of Tooele City.
Serial No 10-8-C-l
Parcel No. 2: Beginning 137 feet West of the Southeast corner of Lot 5, Block 41,
Plat "A", Tooele City Survey, running thence West 196.9$ feet;
thence North 43.5 feet; thence East 196.96 feet, thence South 43.5
feet to the point of beginning. Serial No. 2-57-27
Parcel No. 3: Beginning 303 feet, more or less, South of the Northwest comer of
Block 26, Plat "A", Tooele City Survey, Tooele City, said point of
beginning being the Southwest corner of the Hawker property; and
running thence East 504 feet; thence South 248 feet; thence West 9
feet; thence North 181.5 feet; thence West 495 feet; thence North
66.5 feet to the point of beginning Serial No. 2-42-14
2.

The Court orders that any and all interest, right and title of Glen E. Miller in the

above-described properties be attached. The Defendant is restrained from transferring his interest
to another in anyway.
3.

A Writ of Attachment is hereby authorized by this Court pursuant to Rule 64(c) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
4.

The Court orders that in lieu of requiring a bond be set, that the Plaintiffs will appear

before the Court, upon motion of the Defendant or others, as the case may be, from time to time
during the period of this Writ of Attachment, for the purpose of determining whether the Writ of
Attachment should continue based upon the Defendant's circumstances.
DATED this

/ C day of April, 2001.
BY THE COURT:

DAVID S YOUNG I
Third Distrfct Court Aidgi

2

NOTICE TO DEFENDANTS ATTORNEY
TO:

Gregory P. Hawkins
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, you are hereby notified the

undersigned will hold the original hereof for a period of five (5) days from the date this notice is
mailed to you to allow you sufficient time to file any written objections to the form o_f the foregoing
with the Court and mail a copy to the undersigned. If no objections to the form arefiledwithin that
time, the original hereof will be submitted to the Court for signature and filing.
I do hereby certify I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, on this
^r

day of March, 2001, to the following person(s):

Gregory P. Hawkins
Attorney for Defendant
136 South Main Street, 6th Floor
Salt lake City, Utah 84115

Legal Assistant

1

CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN
r-=S!G!NAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD
• 'STRICT COURT, TOOELE COUNTY, STATE
"UTAH
^
,,

:ATE

:

/

'

DEPUTtfCOURT C£BfiK

3

___

Addendum 3

DOUGLAS F. WHITE, #3443
Attorney for Plaintiffs
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 652-0016
FAX: (801)296-1754

WTH.N NAMED DEFEND,-.i AT j==*T-r^.

g jte.

TOOELE COUNTY, UTAH
BY DEPUTY
THIS

&*.

>

y(
•

)c5^^-<~-^

DAY OF , . „ _ * t

^ j Q p t ,

. FRANK A SCHARMANN
Sheriff, Tooele, Utah

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS,
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST,

WRTT OF ATTACHMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 000301127
Judge David S. Young

GLEN E. MILLER,
Defendants.
THE STATE OF UTAH

To the Sheriff of Tooele County, State of Utah, GREETINGS:
WHEREAS, the above-entitled Court, on the 26th day of March, 2001, granted the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment; and as such, any and all interest,rightand title of Glen
E. Miller in the below described real property is hereby attached.
WHEREAS, the Sheriff of Tooele County, State of Utah, is hereby directed to attach and
keep safe all of the real property set forth below until further order of the Court, pursuant to Rule
64(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Said real property hereby attached is described as follows
ParcelNo 1

All of Lot 1, Oak View Heights #4, a subdivision of Tooele City Serial No 10-8-C-l

ParcelNo 2

Beginningl37feetWestoftheSoutheastcornerofLot5,Block4l,Pla1 "A", Tooele
City Survey, running thence West 196 96 feet, thence North 43 5 feet, thence East
196 96 feet, thence South 43 5 feet to the point of beginning Serial No 2-57-27

Parcel No 3

Beginning 303 feet, more or less, South of the Northwest comer ofBlock 26, Plat
"A", Tooele City Survey, Tooele City, said point of beginning being the Southwest
comer of the Hawker property, and running thence East 504 feet, thence South 248
feet, thence West 9 feet, thence North 1815 feet, thence West 495 feet, thence North
66 5 feet to the point of beginning Serial No 2-42-14

Given under my hand and the seal of said Court this tf day of April, A D 2001.

Ijt&foS
"HT-As $£k
1

CLERK

-

r
»u = , THAT ") H C IS M T P U . COPY C f /
C I'PLDOCO'lENTONFiLCINTHETHiRD
^ T I I C T COURT TOOELE COUNTY STATU

,,;T,H

/-7-«y

V
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Addendum 4

J

DOUGLAS F. WHITE, #3443
Attorney for Plaintiffs
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 652-0016
FAX: (80n 296-1754

BD DISTRICT COURT TOOELE

FILED B v

A

E 1 & 4 9 0 6
B 0 6 8 7
P OO
Date 15-JUN-2001 IE:00pm
Fee:
1 8 . 0 0 Cash
CALLEEN B. PESHELL, R e c o r d e r

OlSTK^feS&GTftS F

IN THE THIRD

TOOELE COUNTY CORPORATION

TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF T

JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS,
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
GLENF Mil 1 i'K

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER ON MOTION FOR
PREJUDGMENT WRIT OF
ATTACHMENT

Civil No, 000301127
Judge David S. Young

Defendants.
The Plaintiffs' Mot^

judgment Writ of Attachment came before the Court on the

lay of March, 2001, before the Honorable David S. *

5 Plaintiffs were present

and represented by their -itloi itc v. I h miilx, I* White; the Defendant was not personally present, but
- - ^presented by his attorney, Gregory P. Hawkins; the Court having rev iewed the pleadings and
the evidence by proffer of tin »H..nu.j\s, and good cause appearing therefore, now enters the
following Order:
1

»e Plaintiffs' Molt »^ 1 ,, irejudgment Writ of Attachment against the following

described parcels of real property is hereby granted:

E 1 & 4 9 0 6

BOG87

P OOP.e

Parcel No. 1: All of Lot 1, Oak View Heights #4, a subdivision of Tooele City.
Serial No. 10-8-C-l
Parcel No. 2: Beginning 137 feet West of the Southeast corner of Lot 5, Block 41,
Plat "A", Tooele City Survey, running thence West 196.96 feet;
thence North 43.5 feet; thence East 196.96 feet; thence South 43.5
feet to the point of beginning. Serial No. 2-57-27
Parcel No. 3: Beginning 303 feet, more or less, South of the Northwest corner of
Block 26, Plat "A", Tooele City Survey, Tooele City, said point of
beginning being the Southwest corner of the Hawker property; and
running thence East 504 feet; thence South 248 feet; thence West 9
feet; thence North 181.5 feet; thence West 495 feet; thence North
66.5 feet to the point of beginning. Serial No. 2-42-14
2.

The Court orders that any and all interest, right and title of Glen E. Miller in the

above-described properties be attached. The Defendant is restrained from transferring his interest
to another in anyway.
3.

A Writ of Attachment is hereby authorized by this Court pursuant to Rule 64(c) of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
4.

The Court orders that in lieu of requiring a bond be set, that the Plaintiffs will appear

before the Court, upon motion of the Defendant or others, as the case may be, from time to time
during the period of this Writ of Attachment, for the purpose of determining whether the Writ of
Attachment should continue based upon the Defendant's circumstances.
DATED this
A

day of April, 2001.
BY THE COURT:

DAVID S. YdUNGJ
Third Distrfct Court Jtidgi

2

E I G 4 9 0 6

B0 6 8 7

P OOE3

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY
TO:

Gregory P. Hawkins
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, you are hereby notified the

undersigned will hold the original hereof for a period of five (5) days from the date this notice is
mailed to you to allow you sufiBcient time tofileany written objections to the form of the foregoing
with the Court and mail a copy to the undersigned. If no objections to the form arefiledwithin that
time, the original hereof will be submitted to the Court for signature and filing.
I do hereby certify I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, on this
^^T day of March, 2001, to the following person(s):
Gregory P. Hawkins
Attorney for Defendant
136 South Main Street, 6th Floor
Salt lake City, Utah 84115

xilzh £u
JUDWETE^SON
Legal Assistant
I CERTIFY THAI THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF AN
ORIGINAL DOCUMENT ON FILE IN THE THIRD
DISTRICT COURT, TOOELE COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH s\
A

HATP- A^MH

Ity^/)m

DEPUTY COURT C L S I R

3

Addendum 5

Declaration of Homestead
1. I, Lori Lee Thiriot Miller, claimant, a married woman hereby declare that I am
entitled to a homestead exemption under Utah Constitution, Article XXII Section
2. Claimant further states that her spouse has not filed a declaration of homestead.
3. The homestead claimed as exempt in this Declaration of Homestead is located
at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Tooele County, Utah and is more fully described
to wit:
Beginning 303 feet, more or less, south of the Northwest corner of block 26,
Plat "A", Tooele City Survey; Tooele City, said point of beginning being the
Southwest corner of the Hawker Property; and running thence East 504;
thence South 248 feet; thence West 9 feet; thence North 181.5 feet; thence
West 495 feet; thence North 66.5 feet to the point of beginning.

V
>
V
^

4. The estimated cash value of this real property is $85,000.
5. The amount of the homestead claimed is $120,000 as computed as follows:
Lori Lee Thiriot Miller, 47, 358 N. 100 E. Tooele, Utah
Glen Eugene Miller,
48, 358 N. 100 E. Tooele, Utah
Thomas Samuel Miller, 21, 358 N. 100 E. Tooele, Utah
Angela Miller,
18, 358 N. 100 E. Tooele, Utah
Kimberly Miller,
16, 358 N. 100 E. Tooele, Utah
Elizabeth Miller,
14, 358 N. 100 E. Tooele, Utah

r'sracT COURT, TOOELE C O U N W S ^ . - . ^ XN

CFUTAH.

-,/•

f?

; fe? *'<-

„ ii/-7-^y
n
~£-V<
OAi fc-^i . , ^
U ; rp ,
—^JQcZ&A&AT%:-- "
^PUTYCOUMTCLERKW

.. ^ . ^_

,y ^
•

g^^O^^MpA
Signature of Claimant

{\

j •
•

•'

£ 1 9 8 & 2 5 B 8 3 4P
E7-HAR-2003 1:14pm
Fee:' "10.08 Cash

Date

'
.

VV, % r
• »' \ ,
Oi^-CA^ //
STATE OF T J T A H % j ^ ) f o - 5 i t ' ^ '

CftLLEEN PESHELL,

Recorder

Filed By CBP
For LORI MILLER
TODELE COUNTY CORPORATION

COUNTY OF TOOELE )

Acknowledged, subscribed and sworn before me, ^ A , , M , ? ^ ^SrfiFy.nr^
a Notary Public for the State of Utah, this cg^day of Mf\dCi4
My commission expires /p { Ofn^Af.Z

^^v-^.

2003.

Addendum 6

* - - £ D DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District
APR 1 8 2003
^ T O O E L E COUNTY

y

£_

DOUGLAS F. WHITE, #3443
Attorney for Plaintiffs
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (435) 843-9399
FAX: (435) 843-9399

Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS,
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
:)
]

JUDGMENT

;

vs.
GLEN E.MILLER,

)
)

Civil No. 000301127
Judge Randall Skanchy

Defendants.

COMES NOW, the Court and having considered the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment and Defendant's response to it, and having reviewed the pleadings on file herein and good
cause appearing therefore; the Court now hereby enters the following order and JUDGMENT as
follows:
1.

There is no genuine issue of material facts in dispute; and therefore, the Plaintiffs are

entitled to a judgment against the Defendant as a matter of law, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah
1

~"

Rules of Civil Procedure.
2.

The Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby granted.

3.

Jerry Houghton and Susan Houghton are granted a judgment, jointly and severally,

against the Defendant, Glen E. Miller, in the amount of $88,129.00 as of November 30, 2002. Post
judgment interest to accrue at the contract rates.
4.

Kendall R. Thomas, Marlene Thomas and the 199 5 Thomas Family Trust are granted

a judgment, jointly and severally, against the Defendant, Glen E.. Miller. Post judgment interest to
accrue at the contract rates.

V

u

^

^

^

i

4 < n , W , % *

< p ^ -

DATED this J p ^ day of April, 2003.
BY THE COURT:

RANDALUSKANCHT
Judge

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT'S ATTORNEY

TO:

LONN LITCHFIELD
Pursuant to Rule 4.504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, you are hereby notified the

undersigned will hold the original hereof for a period of five (5) days from the date this notice is
j
mailed to••you to allow you sufficienttii^tcrf}le any^tten objections to the form of the foregoing

| ^ V - ^

^

I

J

D 3 i H r COURT TOOE-.E COUNTY S.Alu

cufaK

with the Court and mail a copy to the undersigned. If no objections to the form are filed within that
time, the original hereof will be submitted to the Court for signature and filing.
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, on
this 3rd day of April, 2003, to the following person(s):

Lonn Litchfield
ATKIN & HAWKINS
Attorney at Law
136 South Main, 6th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

ATL\

JUD^ETER§ON, Legal Assistant

3

Addendum 7

DOUGLAS F. WHITE, #3443
Attorney for Plaintiffs
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive
Bountiful, Utah 84016
Telephone: (435) 843-9399
FAX: (435) 843-9399

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS,
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST,

WRIT OF EXECUTION

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 000301127
Judge Randall Skanchy

GLEN E. MILLER,
Defendant.
THE STATE OF UTAH

To the Sheriff of Tooele County, State of Utah, GREETINGS:
WHEREAS, Judgment was rendered in this action by the above Court in £
the 10th day of April, 2003, against said Defendant, Glen E. Miller, and in favor of said Plaintiffs,
in the amount of:
Judgment amount
Estimated costs of this Writ
TOTAL

$271,398.00
$
65.00
sc^2?l,46

Retcrtk>nsh-!
Time
Address

DeputY

with interest pursuant to judgment contract rates, from the date of judgment until paid, plus afteraccruing costs.
THESE ARE, THEREFORE, to command you to collect the aforesaicfjudgment, with
costs, interest, and fees, and to sell enough of the Defendant's real or personal property to satisfy the
same. This shall be your sufficient warrant for so doing. Within sixty (60) days after your receipt
of this Writ, return this Writ with a statement and certificate of your doings in completing the
service. WHEREOF FAIL NOT.
Given under my hand and the seal of said Court this /

2

day of A p ^ A . D . 2003.

DOUGLAS F. WHITE, #3443
Attorney for Plaintiffs
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (435) 843-9399
FAX: (435) 843-9399

IN THE TOOELE VALLEY JUSTICE'S COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN
]
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS, ]
1
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST,
}
Plaintiffs,
vs.

PRAECIPE

]
]

GLEN E. MILLER,

])
)

Civil No. 000301127
Judge Randall Skanchy

Defendant.

TO THE SHERIFF OF TOOELE COUNTY:
Pursuant to the Writ of Execution herewith handed you, you are required to levy on and sell
the following property belonging to the judgment debtor, Glen E. Miller. Said properties are located
at 358 North 100 East, Tooele, Tooele County, State of Utah and lot behind 288 North Main (see
plat map), Tooele, Tooele County, State of Utah, respectively; and further described as follows:
PARCEL NO. 1: Beginning 303 feet South of the Northwest Corner of Block 26,
Plat "A", Tooele City Survey; running thence East 504 feet; thence South 248 feet;
thence West 9 feet; thence North 181.5 feet; thence West 495 feet; thence North 66.5
feet to point of beginning, combining T-504 and T-504-1. Containing 0.77 acres.
Parcel No. 02-42-14.

PARCEL NO. 2: Beginning 137 feet West of the Southeast Corner of Lot 5, Block
41, Plat "A", Tooele City Survey; running thence West 196.96 feet; thence'North
43.5 feet; thence East 196.96 feet; thence South 435. feet to the point of beginning
out of 2-57-17. Containing 0.20 acres. Parcel No. 2-57-27.
DATED this _Jo_ day of April, 2003.

v~L * uxJP

D^UGIAS F. WHITE
Attorned for Plaintiffs
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Addendum 8

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JERRY HOUGHTON,
Plaintiff,
Case N o . 000301127

vs .
GLEN E. MILLER,
Defendant.

Hearing
Electronically Recorded on
August 4, 2003

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE RANDALL N. SKANCHY
Third District Court Judge

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

DOUGLAS F. WHITE
3282 South Sunset Hollow Dr
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (435)843-9399

For the Defendant:

GLEN E. MILLER
(Appearing pro se)
(Address not provided)
(Phone number not provided)

Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe, CSR/CCT

1909 South Washington Avenue
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 377-0027

-21

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on August 4, 2003)

3

THE COURT: This is the matter of Jerry Houghton versus

4

Glen Miller.

5

aside the writ of —

6

we're at.

7

It's case 000301127.

Mr. Miller's motion to set

set aside the judgment.

So that's where

Go ahead.

MR. MILLER: Ycur Honor, could I have a pen —

a hand

8

released so that I might be able to use a pen so that I could

9

take notes?

10
11

THE COURT: I'll only do that if my security officers
indicate that's acceptable.

12
13

MR. MILLER: Also, this is a hearing on the writ of
execution, or is this a hearing on the motion for dismissal?

14

THE COURT: It's a hearing on both.

15

MR. MILLER: Okay.

16

So we'll be discussing both at this

time?

17

THE COURT: I think so.

18

MR. MILLER: Because —

19

okay.

Because I was not told

that we would be having the hearing on both, your Honor.

20

THE COURT: Well, you've come a long way and it would

21

be nice to have you be able to have everything handled today.

22

MR. MILLER: Okay.

Whatever we —

before I —

we

23

discuss the writ of execution, your Honor, may I ask some

24

questions pertaining to the judgment itself?

25

THE COURT: No, no.

I just want you to present your

-3
1

argument.

2

a lot of people that need to be heard.

You know, I've got a busy calendar here.

We've got

3

MR. MILLER: Well, this —

4

THE COURT; I need to hear your argument on this

5

particular issue so we can go forward.

6

MR. MILLER: Okay.

I have outlined in the motion to

7

dismiss the issues involved.

8

was a judgment at all in this case. I had not received any

9

notice until I received the writ of execution on the 6th of

10

June, and so under the summary judgment I had not even been

11

notified that there was a judgment, that I could respond to the

12

judgment or that matter.

13

I was never even aware that there

Also, in the writ of execution there gave an amount

14

of the judgment of $271,000 that was granted to the plaintiffs.

15

I was wondering where that figure came from in this particular

16

case.

17
18

THE COURT: You know, the way things work here, you
make an argument and I listen to it.

19

MR. MILLER

20

THE COURT: I am not here to be questioned.

Okay.
I simply

21

hear your argument.

22

want to say that is "and I think that's in error/' or something

23

like that

What you may say, then, is the way you'd

—

24

MR. MILLER: Okay.

25

THE COURT: —

as opposed to posing some question to me
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about it (inaudible).

2
3

MR. MILLER: Okay, your Honor, this is the first time
I've ever done this, so

4

—

THE COURT: Well, you've done a very nice job in terms

5

of what you've provided the Court.

6

and useful.

7
8

It's been very beneficial

So you're doing great so far.

Just

MR. MILLER: Okay, thank you, your Honor.
scared, too, and it's just

9

—
Yes, and I'm

—

THE COURT: No reason to be scared.

10

MR. MILLER: Okay.

Also, the reason I bring that

11

point

12

November of 1999, but in January or February of 2000 they

13

received a judgment on the promissory notes, and that was

14

already issued in, like I say, in January or February of the

15

year 2000.

16

up is that the plaintiffs had filed a lawsuit in

This particular lawsuit, as I understand it, as

17

I don't have all the paperwork pertaining to it, is a

18

supplementary one.

19

personally for fraud, and so that one —

20

judgment in this second lawsuit filed by the plaintiffs against

21

me is for the amount of the promissory note that has already

22

been resolved under the first lawsuit that was —

23

awarded a judgment of in 2000 against LD&B Corporation.

24
25

It's one filed after that against me

So according to —

and now if this

they were

under the rules of the res judicata

this shouldn't be able to be tried again.

So that is a reason
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for —

2

judgment should be set aside.

3
4

another reason not mentioned in my motion as to why this

THE COURT: Mr. White, does your client have a judgment
against Mr. Miller that precedes this one on these same

—

5

MR. WHITE: No.

6

THE COURT: —

7

MR. WHITE: It is against a company called LD&B.

8

THE COURT: Okay.

9

MR. WHITE: Totally separate.

issues?

All right.

10

THE COURT: What I'd indicate to you, Mr. Miller, is

11

that parties may sue people in their individual and in their

12

corporate capacities, and maybe that's what occurred.

13

judgment has been taken against your corporation or whatever

14

it was, and I'm not privy to that, so I don't know.

A

15

MR. MILLER: Uh-huh.

16

THE COURT: And B, subsequently a judgment was taken

17

against you personally.

18

based upon the allegations of self dealing or not maintaining

19

a corporation, that you might be subject to these particular

20

judgments, but regardless of that, the judgment's been entered.

21

So now we understand that they're not —

22

judgments taken against you.

23

apply.

24

25

Maybe in this case based upon

—

they're not two

So res judicata is not going to

MR. MILLER: But the promissory notes are exactly the
same.
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THE COURT: It doesn' t matter.

2

MR. MILLER: And that would be a --- that would be a

3

defense that would b e raised at a trial.

4

THE COURT: You see, res judicata, of course, would

5

mean that you had been sued twice in your individual capacity

6

for the same debt by the same parties.

7
8

MR. MILLER: I was sued in that first one, and the
judgment was issued, though, against LD&B Management.

9
10

THE COURT: All right.
there.

11
12

MR. MILLER: Okay.

Now, I'd like to right now, your

Honor, address the homestead issue that I filed

13
14

I understand your argument

—

THE COURT: Address the service issue for me, please.
That's the most important one.

15

MR. MILLER: The service issue?

16

THE COURT: Yes.

17

MR. MILLER: Okay.

The only service which I received

18

was the writ of execution.

There was no other service that I

19

received.

20

informed of any lawsuit that was pending against me in these

21

proceedings.

22

asked if there had —

23
24
25

I was not informed of any judgment.

I was not

I had written my attorney on February 13th and
was anything that was going on.

THE COURT: Now, your attorney unfortunately withdrew,
and so this is where you end up.
THE COURT: And he withdrew, as I understood, in April
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1

or —

but he never sent me any notification of withdrawal.

2

THE COURT: Withdrew.

He withdrew on the 25tr of April

3

2003, although I note that no order was entered by a Judge,

4

meaning he hadn't officially withdrawn.

5

MR. MILLER: Yeah, Mr. White informed me today that

6

he had withdrawn.

7

written

I had

—

8
9

That was the first I had heard.

THE COURT: Well, he believes he's withdrawn, but until
an order is executed by the Judge, he hasn't.

10

MR. MILLER: And so I have not —

I had not received

11

anything pertaining to the issues of the case, being able

12

to argue against the summary judgment, motion for summary

13

judgment.

14

m

15

because I was never informed of the judgment and I was never

16

able to provide a defense.

17

the —

I've outlined in my motion other elements pertaining
to have it dismissed as to why it should be dismissed

THE COURT: Well, let me indicate something for you

18

so you fully understand it.

19

summons in this case.

20

retained Counsel, and Counsel was representing you.

21

while Counsel was representing you, this motion for summary

22

judgment was filed.

23

opposition to that motion for summary judgment, and this matter

24

was heard before your Counsel chose LO withdraw.

25

You were served with the initial

That is, you were served because you had
Indeed

Your Counsel actually filed a response

So whether your Counsel was informing you of what's

m
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going on, that may or may not have happened, but you had

2

representation, whatever it was, through this lawyer, whomever

3

he was that you retained, but he was representing you through

4

—

5

So service on your lawyer is service on you.

up through and including the time this judgment was entered.

6

MR. MILLER: Okay.

7

THE COURT: Go to the homestead issue.

8

MR. MILLER: Okay.

9

There

—

Yes, your Honor.

Okay.

As you're

aware, your Honor, the homestead is a Constitutional creation,

10

and as such it's not just a privilege, but an absolute right.

11

It's intended to secure and protect the home against creditors

12

as a means of support to every family, and that's found in

13

Kimball versus Salisbury case.

14

Black's Law Dictionary defines a Constitutional

15

homestead as a homestead along with its exemption from forced

16

sale conferred upon the head of a household by a State

17

Constitution.

18

Constitution outlines that a homestead law needs to be passed.

19

So therefore the homestead law itself is found in code Section

20

78-23-3.

21

Article 22, Section 1 of the Utah State

Now, the term "homestead" is not defined itself m

the

22

code section.

However, according to the terms of statutory

23

construction —

24

Webster's and also in Black's Dictionary —

25

homestead is defined as the home, the appurtenances, the out-

you know, we turn to a dictionary, and again in
Law Dictionary

—
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buildings and the land surrounding the primary residence of a

2

family, a person or his family.

3

The property located at 358 North 100 East is the

4

principal residence of my family.

5

in Tooele County Recorder's Office on March 27th, 2003.

6

I do not have a copy of that.

7

courtroom, she would have a copy of that if you want to view

8

that as an official document, your Honor.

9
10
11

The homestead was recorded
Now,

If my wife is present in the

THE COURT: Let's just for this argument assume that it
exists.
MR. MILLER: Okay.

The Utah Supreme Court ruled that

12

the exemption statutes are to be liberally construed m

13

of the debtor to protect him and his family from hardship, and

14

that was stated m

15

Also, m

favor

Russell M. Miller Company versus Given.
the Court case Folson versus Asper they

16

stated that because homestead is a Constitutional creation,

17

all laws thereto must be liberally construed to protect it

18

and make it effective for the dependent and the help —

19

dependent and helpless to insure them shelter and support.

20

Again, m

the

Pentagopolis versus Manning, they said

21

that the law should be broadly construed to accomplish its

22

beneficent purpose.

23

In the case of McMurdie versus Chugg, one of the

24

beneficent purposes to the homestead was given when it said

25

that the law was to protect the land which was designated
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homestead against forced sale for an ordinary judgment lien.

2

Subsection 3 of the law of Section 78-23-3 clearly

3

states, "A homestead is exempt from judicial lien and from

4

levy, execution or forced sale."

5

m

6

house, out-buildings and adjoining land owned and occupied by a

7

person or family as a primary residence is exempt from judicial

8

lien and from levy, execution and forced sale.

9

Applying the definition found

the dictionary about the homestead, it said it would be the

There are four exemptions that are given to which

10

a homestead could be levied.

11

property taxes and assessments on the property.

12

judgment is not for those.

13

A security interest m

One is a statutory lien for
Plaintiffs

the property and judicial liens

14

for debts created for the purchase price of the property.

15

Again, the plaintiff's judgment is not for that purpose.

16

Three, judicial liens, which is what theirs is,

17

obtained on debts created by failure to provide support or

18

maintenance for dependent children.

19

lien for the support of dependent children, or maintenance.

20

Theirs is not a judicial

Four, consensual liens obtained on debts created by

21

mutual contract, and there's nothing consensual about the

22

plaintiff s lien on the property, so that exemption does nor

23

apply there.

So none of the exemptions as stated m

24

cover that —

the plaintiffs judgment.

25

the law

Now, up to this point I've only talked about the
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beneficent purpose which is to provide security and protecting

2

a family's home against the creditors, but there's another

3

element of the law, and that is that of the homestead amount.

4

While the Courts have ruled that the homestead is

5

protected, they have also stated that a homestead cannot be

6

used to defeat a lien that's already on the property.

7

and there is a Court case —

8

Chugg.

9

Okay,

and that was in McMurdie versus

Now, there is also a case where the Utah Supreme

10

Court allowed the a sale of the homestead, but still granted

11

the exemption amount, which —

12

homestead appear that it is an amount, not the homestead.

13

was in the Court case of Gilroy versus Lowe, but the facts of

14

that case are totally different.

okay, which tends to make the
That

15

In that case a judgment was awarded against the Lowes,

16

and then eight years l=>ter, upon the execution of that judgment

17

and after an order had been issued by the Court to force sale

18

the property, then they filed the homestead claiming that it

19

was exempt, and a judgment which was eight years later

20

again, after the judgment they filed the homestead simply as

21

a means to defeating that judgment and to preserving their

22

home, but they were still granted the homestead amount: because

23

of the homestead law.

24
25

—

THE COURT: And how do you balance this homestead
amount, which is a smail amount —

$20,000 m

the case of the
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primary residence —

2

be subject to execution?

3

against the rest of what might otherwise
That is, the home itself.

MR. MILLER: That is a very valid point, your Honor,

4

and I would like to emphasize that point in this —

5

time, because the Tenth Circuit Court around 1994 in the case

6

David Dorsey Distributing versus Sanders stated that a judgment

7

lien never attaches to the homestead.

8

homestead under Utah law.

9

at this

It never attaches to the

Now, there's another case called Gisey Walker Company

10

versus Biggs where again they talk about where the exemption

11

amount is lower than the value of the property and say that it

12

could be sold at a forced sale.

13

law at that time which was m

14

that a homestead could be levied in excess.

15

been dropped from the present statute that there no longer can

16

be that.

17

However, it referred to the

force, which specifically stated
That wording has

Now, the Courts have had to weigh the differences to

18

what is the beneficent purpose of the homestead and what is an

19

actual use of the homestead in protecting a family and a home

20

and the people, and in the particular cases where they have

21

allowed for the execution of the homestead, in each of those

22

cases the homestead was filed after the judgment, and it was

23

filed after the writ of execution had been given, and it was

24

only used as a means to defeat that execution.

25

However, m

other Court cases such as —

as I
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1

mentioned

2

Court ruled that the plaintiff could not assert a lien against

3

an existing homestead already vested m

4

could not dc that under the Con stitution.

5

assert the lien against an existing homestead.

6

— m

McMurdie versus Chugg, it talks that - - the

That he

the defendant.

Meaning he couldn' t

It was later ruled that the right to claim a homestead

7

exemption is a right that the head of family may assert to

8

prevent sale under execution of his homestead at any time

9

before sale of the premises, unless the claim against such

10

property has been previously asserted and actually adjudicated

11

against him.

12

versus Gardner.

13

they can assert that any time prior to the sale as long as it

14

hasn't been adjudicated.

15

That was found in Utah Builder's Supply Company
So what they have —

Now, as I stated, m

the Court has ruled that

all of the cases where the

16

homestead was executed —

17

understand, a lot.

18

used that, and the Court of Appeals has also said that it's not

19

fair for a person to continue living in their home and enjoy

20

that living, and then declare bankruptcy while all of those

21

other creditors have been left to hang dry out in the wind, and

22

defraud them of that money.

and they use it m

bankruptcy, as I

I'm not familiar with that, but they have

23

Now, finally, the Utah Supreme Court ruled m

24

Exchange Savings Bank versus Teachen that the levy of execution

25

upon a homestead is not voidable, but it's absolutely void.

Payson
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Now, in our case the homestead was prepared and filed prior to

2

any judgment and without any attempt on our part or the part of

3

my wife to defeat any existing lien.

4
5

THE COURT: When did you say the date of that filing
was?
MR. MILLER: The date of the filing was the 26th day

6

That was the date that she filed —

or 27th day

7

of March 2003.

8

of March.

9

sooner, but the property was in such bad condition from renters

She signed it on the 26tn

She would have done it

10

having been m

11

spent about four, five months trying to prepare the house to

12

make it just habitable.

13

she could move m , she filed the declaration of homestead.

14

in an attempt to defeat any judgment.

15

escape any creditors, but as a protection so that she might

16

have a place to live.

17

there and left it unsecured and such, that she

So as soon as it was habitable and

We had a house previously.

Not

Not in an attempt to

A fire burned it.

It was

18

then foreclosed upon, as the insurance company or the bank

19

refused to allow the money to fix the house to be released.

20

don't know all of the details and the particulars because I was

21

m

22

So after that time, we looked and this house was available

23

for her to move into, and she prepared it to move into.

24

again, as I said, it was not —

25

her, to provide stability for the family, and to proviae for

I

prison at the time that that occurred, but we did lose that.

Now,

it was to provide stability to
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her.

2

Then another event has just recently occurred m

this

3

Court, your Honor, where this past Thursday I received a copy

4

of an order of separate maintenance from this Court which was

5

for my wife Lori, and it granted to her the use of the property

6

located at 358 North 100 East as an award of alimony for her,

7

and m

8

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, property that is necessary

9

for support, such as alimony —

reviewing the exemption statute, as well as Rule 69 of

and that is found in 78-23-6

10

child support, et cetera is exempt from execution.

11

was given to her by the Court as alimony for her to live in.

12

Again, another reason not just for the homestead, but for the

13

alimony as well.

14

from levy of the property located there at 358 North Main.

15

This home

Therefore, this also creates an exemption

Now, there is a second piece of property listed in

16

the (inaudible) that was a smaller, little lot that is located

17

at about 280 South Main Street here m

18

a primary residence, so therefore the execution amount of

19

homestead, as we had talked earlier, would apply to this, and

20

under the statute it can have a maximum execution —

21

maximum execution, but a statutory exemption of $10,000 per

22

household.

23

Tooele.

This is not

or not a

As stated in my request for the hearing, the rax

24

appraisal that I had last seen on it was for $4,000.

So that

25

the value of that piece of property is sufficiently low that

—
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it would also exempt it from levy.

2

should be levied under this case and then the homestead granted

3

based under the exemption amount for that, then, you know, I

4

have no objection to having that property sold at that point

5

at this time, is my

6
7

If the Court deems that it

—

THE COURT: Is there a homestead exemption that's been
declared and filed on that property?

8

MR. MILLER: As I understand, your Honor, yes, sir.

9

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

10

MR. MILLER: So in summary

11

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

12

—

—
(Inaudible) .

I will now

hear from Mr. White.

13

MR. MILLER: Can I make a summary, your Honor?

14

THE COURT: No.

15

MR. MILLER: Okay.

16

THE COURT: I think you've pretty well (inaudible).

17

MR. WHITE: Thank you, your Honor, and I compliment

18

Mr. Miller for doing his homework on this case.

I would like

19

to add a couple of facts that he has left out.

20

he has indicated that the law is that the homestead exemption,

21

as powerful as it might be cannot: be used to offset or take

22

preference to a lien that's already recorded on the property.

23

I read most of the cas^s that he cited.

24

much dispute.

25

few of them, but let me just indicate a couple of facts to the

In particular

I really don't have

His interpretation I think is a little off on a
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Court, and I think that we can straighten that out.

2

Number one, as to his question about the judgment of

3

$271,000, if Mr. Miller adds up the amounts owed to my clients,

4

which are in the judgment, Jerry Houghton and Sue Houghton were

5

granted a judgment jointly and severely of $88,129.

6

and Mrs. Thomas, Marlene and Kendall, were granted a judgment

7

of $183,269, which roughly figured $271,000 with the interest

8

up to that point m

9

Mr. Thomas

time.

Addressing the motion to set aside the judgment, I

10

don't believe anything in there is justification at this point

11

in time to have it set aside.

12

all of the communications and pleadings and whatnot that went

13

on before were sent to Mr. A t k m , his attorney.

14

cited correctly that Mr. A t k m made a response to the summary

15

judgment.

16

irregularities there that I am aware of.

17

about two weeKS later and since that time I've been sending

18

everything to Mr. Miller.

19

The Court correctly stated that

The Court

The Court granted it under Rule 4.501.

There was no

Mr. A t k m withdrew

THE COURT: AnH I can make that ruling now.

That is,

20

I'll deny the motion to set aside the judgment based upon non-

21

service, given the fact that Counsel was present at the time,

22

retained by Mr. Miller, and indeed filed motions m

23

to this question about judgment.

24
25

MR. WHITE: Thank you.

opposition

Now, addressing the homestead

issues, Mr. Miller has been convicted of defrauding about 200
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people to the tune of about 8 or $9,000,000.

2

part and parcel of that.

3

m

4

to 10 or 11 counts of fraud.

5

My judgments are

The reason the summary judgment was

fact filed in the case originally was because he pled guilty

That conviction was entered m

this Court through

6

the summary judgment process, and hence, he is personally

7

responsible for those amounts.

8

understand that amount.

9

juste type of res judicata argument, but I think the Court

10

I'm sure that he may not

I think that's the basis of his res

will note that that is not exactly how that rule works.

In

i

11

fact, the criminal case in that matter has also ordered

12

restitution, and any one of those defendants purportedly at

13

some point m

14

time may go after his property.

Here's the facts that the Court ought to know, that

15

I'm sure that Mr. Miller is not aware of.

First of all, when

16

we filed —

17

Thomases, we also filed and obtained a motion for a prejudgment

18

writ of attachment because of the allegations of fraud, and

19

because Mr. Miller had filed and recorded with the County

20

Recorder's Office a document indicating that he was no longer

21

to be considered a resident of the State of Utah, and because

22

he was charged with fraud, that gave Judge Young the basis to

23

go ahead and grant a writ of attachment on the property -char

or I filed the complaint for the Houghtons and the

24

THE COURT: Whpn was that writ issued?

25

MR. WHITE: Your Honor, the motion was filed

m

—
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November of 2000, and the order was actually signed A p n l 17th

2

of 2001.

I have a copy of the order.

3

THE COURT: I don't need that.

4

MR. WHITE: Instead of looking through your file, it

5

was signed on April 17th, 2001 by Judge Young.

6
7

THE COURT: Why don't you give it to the bailiff and
that way we'll at least have

8
9

—

MR. WHITE: Which includes the house he was currently
residing m

at 871 East Upland Drive, the 358 North house, and

10

the little piece of property that there's nothing on.

11

virtually a weed patch in an alleyway.

12

It's

We know that, and I purport to the Court that those

13

were the properties that I worked with the SEC attorneys to

14

exclude from their case in Salt Lake.

15

funds of his fraud to those properties, and those properties

16

were solely in his name.

17

them.

18

They did not trace any

Not even his wife's name were on

So we asked the Court m

this County to issue that

19

writ.

20

we wanred to make sure that those weren't deeded away or

21

squandered away somehow in between.

22

Because of all of the problems that Mr. Miller had,

Now, that becomes of critical importance.

23

add, the writ of attachment —

24

attachment which was filed with the Court as well.

25

I might

that's the order, the writ of

THE COURT: You're saying this prejudgment writ of

-201

attachment was first in time over a homestead exemption.

2

MR. WHITE: At that

3

THE COURT: And the homestead exemption is really being

4

filed to defraud creditors.

5
6

—

MR. WHITE: Well, I'm not sure that he understood the
meaning of that.

7

THE COURT: Sure.

8

MR. WHITE: I'm not saying that he did that, but I am

9

citing a corpus juris secundum in which it states, "Obligations

10

existing prior to the establishment of the homestead right will

11

not be defeated where the debtor subsequently claimed that the

12

premise was his homestead."

13

Chugg case, which is a Utah case.

14

In fact, that case cited is the

It further states that the rule —

excuse me —

that

15

the exemption cannot be claimed as against valid liens which

16

have attached to the premises before they are impressed with

17

the homestead character, whether such liens are obtained by

18

contract or by operation of law.

19

I would suggest to the Court, and I have a reference

20

for that, the rules applied in these cases of liens are created

21

by —

liens created by attachment.

I have

—

22

THE COURT: Of course, this is a post-judgment

23

MR. WHITE: Yes.

24

THE COURT: —

25

MR. WHITE: And I have a case on that as well.

attachment.

—
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THE COURT: Okay.

2

MR. WHITE: The Chugg case, which is an older case,

3

simply states that existing liens on property cannot be

4

defeated by subsequently claiming the property is a homestead.

5

Now, that's important because what Mr. Miller said, he was

6

living, his wife was living, all his dependents were living at

7

8 91.

8

—

There was a fire.

They never fixed it up.

Whatever the

it was later foreclosed upon.

9

In fact, several months prior to that time he called

10

me and asked me if I would subrogate our preattachment judge

11

—

12

I agreed to do that.

13

that that actually never did take place, but we did sign the

14

documents and whatnot, in fact, to do that.

15

that house when he was living there with his wife and with his

16

dependents.

or lien, so that he could go ahead and refinance the house.

17

He tells me today for the first time

So our lien was on

He tells me today he was actually incarcerated on

18

March 27rh, 2002.

19

reasons.

20

year before he even went to jail, and he was still residing

21

that house.

22

months later m

23

after that.

24
25

Now, that date's important for obvious

Our lien was against the house April 17tv, 2001, a
m

The house caught fire six months later, or seven
December, and in fact it was foreclosed on

Now, the important part is this.
let's make this point first

Mrs. Miller —

well,

Mr. Miller has never occupied
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the premises.

2
3

THE COURT: Right, and she wasn't occupying the
premises.

4

MR. WHITE: And she wasn't occupying the premises and

5

she took occupancy approximately about three months ago,

6

May.

m

7

MR. MILLER: No.

8

MR. WHITE: May, June, July, approximately three months

9

ago she took occupancy.

He told me that they started fixing it

10

up sometime last September.

11

take.

12

trumps the homestead filing of March.

13

it.

14

It doesn't matter which date you

The lien was still on there two years ago, and that lien
There's no doubt about

THE COURT: Is it the Chugg case that you used for

15

support on this, or is it some other case for a prejudgment

16

writ of attachment?

17

MR. WHITE: That's another case, your Honor.

18

THE COURT: Okc.y.

While —

I'd like to cite one other

19

one before I get to that, on the occupancy, because that is

20

interrelated with it.

21

is a Utah case, specifically talks about occupancy and the

22

homestead, and I'm quoting, "It is the occupancy of the

23

premises that gives rise to the homestead claim."

24

occupy it m

25

The Sanders versus Sanders case, which

They must

order to make the claim.

The prejudgment writ is the case of Ephraim versus
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Davis, which is a 1978 case, and I'm citing —

2

here now.

3

service of the writ of attachment the defendant creditor was

4

deprived of significant property interest.

5

seizure by the sheriff encumbered the property with the lien

6

of attachment and inhibited defendant's right to dispose or

7

encumber of its assets."

8
9

and I'm quoting

It says, "In the instant case, upon issuance and

Now, I can tell you m

The constructive

this case they did let the

homestead come m , but only because the sheriff didn't do

10

the service correctly, and they got rid of the lien, but the

11

premise —

12

would m

13

basis of that case.

the principal is the same, that that is a lien that
fact be first in time, first in right, and that's the

14

Furthermore on that case it says, "The prejudgment

15

remedy of attachment allows the deprivation of the property.

16

The debtor's property is therefore subject to the principals

17

embodied," and it goes on.

18

Now, let me talk about the smaller piece of property.

19

There's a small piece of property over off of M a m ,

20

access is through a back alleyway.

21

bell eve.

22

that —

23

It's only

It is 43 feet by 190, I

Also in agreement with Mr. Miller that that case or

there's not a house on it.
Although the code allows people to select m

more than

24

one location, the cases are very clear on that, that m

25

the property, if it's appurtenant to —

fact

doesn't mean attached
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to.

Could be m

2

related to the maintenance or the support of the family.

3

different areas —

has to be m

This little piece of property is m

the back of an

4

alleyway.

5

oiled over.

6

attaches this property that the SEC took and it's behind

7

another person's house right now.

8

for money.

9

possible to claim in either instance that this comes under the

10

homestead exemptions, =md we would ask the Court that it not be

11

included.

12

It's a weed patch right now.

some way

Mr. Miller had an interest m

It should have been
the building that

It has never been leased

It's never been rented for money.

There is no way

Now, Mr. Miller in his declaration actually filed by

13

his wife —

14

claims the house is worth $85,000.

15

Even if the Court found that there was some homestead exemption

16

there, my clients would be entitled to the excess amount.

17

that there is no question.

18

the Court have a copy of that with his motion

—

Our judgment is $260,000.

I do challenge Mrs. Miller's calculation.

To

The current

19

statute which was amended in 2000 allows, and only allows

20

$20,000 per individual.

21

credit —

22

then they're really only entitled m

23

fairness and candidness to the Court as well, I found one case

24

that said if she was m

25

on the title of it, m

Now, if individual is defined as the

or the debtor, which Mr. Miller is, not Mrs. Miller,
my view to $20,000, but

possession of iz,

m

even though she's not

the liberal construction of it, zhe
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Courts would probably grant her an exemption as well, giving

2

them 40, totally maximum, but she did not take possession of

3

the house, and mark it or impress it with the homestead until

4

after that house caught fire and was foreclosed on.

5

about two years difference.

6

Clearly

I observed the house before I filed the motion in

7

November of 2000.

It was totally dilapidated, had been an

8

older rental house, the doors m

9

totally open on it.

the front and the back were

No one was residing there, really, at all,

10

and I don't know that anybody's been in there since they've

11

tried to go in and fix it up now for her.

12

The point there being at the time our prejudgment

13

lien was filed, it was not a homestead to the Millers, period.

14

Likewise, the little piece of property m

15

either, and that should not be considered as a homestead as

16

well.

17

the alleyway was not

I have with me today and I would proffer as testimony

18

an attorney that deals with these exemptions in bankruptcy

19

Court routinely, and he is Mr. Kurt Morris, he would hear

20

he is here and he would testify that the exemption is $40,000

21

max per household.

22

—

What they did is calculate $20,000 per individual, but

23

they included m

their calculation all the children.

Under the

24

new statute amendments of 2000 that's no longer permissible.

25

What they did is increase the exemption from $10,000 to $20,000
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1

and b asica.Lly took the kids out.

2

littl e bit be:fore that, but neve rtheless, that's the maximum

The kids were out actually a

3

H 5'S claimed 100 —- or she' s claimed $120, 000, and

4

that can't be done under that st atute, and I would cite for

5

that 78-23-3(2)(a)(l), which indicates there is a $40,000

6

maximum exemption there.

7

versus Miller case, which indicates the maximum would be

8

$40,000.

9

I would also cite the Homeside

So all in all, your Honor, we have a very valid

10

prejudgment writ of attachment.

11

proceed on when this was started.

12

I gave it to you —

13

Honor?

14
15
16

and

It's that which we wish to
I have a copy of —

the title report.

maybe

Did you have that, your

THE COURT: Oh, yes, I do.

The list of lien holders

MR. WHITE: Showing that —

yeah.

—
Showing that the

17

writ was filed and recorded with the courthouse about two years

18

before this house ever came on the radar screen as far as being

19

a Homestead Act, and I would suggest to the Court that the

20

Court rule in fact that the prejudgment writ of attachment is

21

not affected by the Homestead Act.

22

to sell this house and the other little piece of property m

23

attempt to try and recoup some of their $271,000.

24
25

My clients have the right
an

I appreciate Mr. Miller's response to this matter, but
I think that he just doesn't understand the fact that

m
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Utah, first in time, first in right.

2

reasonable interpretation of the time periods and the way the

3

law works with liens and homesteads that I could suggest to the

4

Court that would construe that statute any other way, and we

5

would ask the Court to permit us to go ahead, readvertise and

6

go ahead with the sell.

Thank you.

7

THE COURT: Okay.

8

do, based upon the arguments today.

9

I don't see any other

This is what the Court's going to

MR. MILLER: Can I get —

your Honor?

10

THE COURT: Yes.

11

MR. MILLER: May I add something to what he has said?

12

THE COURT: How much of a something do you want to add?

13

MR. MILLER: Well, some of the things that he stated as

14

facts that I'd like to clarify and —

15
16
17
18

THE COURT: Okay.

Let's make it —

let's make it

quick.
MR. MILLER: Okay, he stated that I have been convicted
of defrauding people.

That is not correct, your Honor.

19

THE COURT: Well, you pled guilty to

20

MR. MILLER: I pled guilty —

—

I did not plead guilty to

21

defrauding any people.

22

the Court in Salt Lake that I have —

23

it today that I could proffer here as evidence pertaining to

24

the things which he has stated.

25

I have an affidavit which I filed

m

happen to have a copy of

As far as restitution, there was an order of the Court
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that said "restitution as necessary/'

2

of restitution ordered.

3

specifies how to determine restitution.

I have not agreed to

4

any amount of restitution in that case.

There are issues in my

5

affidavit which would address that, if the Court would want me

6

to go over it now or not as far as being responsible.

7

38 —

There was no amount

or 78-38 —

or 77-38(a)-302

The law states that if the criminal conviction

8

specifically assigns liability that is applicable in a civil

9

case.

The things which I pled guilty to, I did not plead

10

guilty, and in my plea I did not agree to pay restitution to

11

all of the victims that had been listed and had been talked to

12

by the prosecutor.

13

In my plea agreement I agreed to state, and it is

14

stated in the plea agreement that I would make restitution

15

to the parties of the lawsuit.

16

were the State of Utah and Glen E. Miller.

17

restitution for the fact that that is who the parties were.

18

In the preliminary hearing I was questioning Mr. Houghton

19

pertaining to the loss of money and how he had gotten a

20

judgment, and the Judge said, "Mr. Miller, Mr. Houghton is not

21

a plaintiff in that, and you are not to discuss loss of money."

22

THE COURT: Yes, but Mr. Miller, you have to understand

The parties in the lawsuit
I agreed to that

23

that individual parties can't bring criminal actions against

24

people.

25

The State does, and the State represents the people.
MR. MILLER: I understand, but this is —

this case,
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the prosecutor stated that the victim was the State, and I have

2

that in my affidavit.

3
4

THE COURT: Well, the victim represent —

the victims

are represented by the State.

5

MR. MILLER: Okay, and so there's an issue there still

6

pertaining to the restitution amount.

7

attachment, let's —

8

March, okay?

9

judgment was not awarded until April 10th.

okay.

The prejudgment writ of

My wife moved into the house in

Which was prior to the post-judgment time.

The

I did not even know

10

until, like I said, I received the writ of execution, that

11

there was even a judgment.

12

A prejudgment writ of attachment, while I am not fully

13

versed in title and claims, that is a pre-writ.

14

lien that has been adjudicated, as was stated in —

15

property until April 10th, when that claim would become official

16

and adjudicated.

17

That is not a
against the

I would also like to say that, you know, this —

in

18

this case to awarding the execution of the writ of execution,

19

and continuing on with that, is just like having a person who

20

gives up 20 years of her life to have —

21

raise —

22

—

23

she is left with nothing, and then they come in and sell the

24

house which she has and has been awarded by this Court as

25

alimony, to kicking her our on the street and saying, n Here is

raise a family, to

to support her husband, and then all of a sudden he is

you know, he abandons her, and if he abandons her and then
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$40,000, whatever, for your inconvenience, and we're sorry."

2

Furthermore, it does authorize that the wife, and the

3

spouse may assert the homestead claim as well, on behalf of the

4

husband and the family, in Section 12.

5

of the

6
7

—
THE COURT: Well, the statute is quite clear that the

maximum amount is $40,000.

8
9

I think I have a copy

MR. MILLER: Yes, but the statute is also very clear
—

and the Tenth Circuit Court making it also clear that a writ

10

of —

11

homestead, and that a homestead, not a homestead amount, is not

12

subject to the levy, as also is the alimony as well.

13

or that a judgment of judicial lien does not attach to a

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

Okay, thank you, Mr. Miller.

14

to the motion to set aside the judgment, I've already ruled

15

on that particular issue.

16

order.

17

Mr. White, if you'll prepare the

This Court's going to find that the maximum amount
So I'd limit any

18

per household is $40,000 in this case.

19

right of homestead to $40,000.

20

of findings that the writ of attachment was filed somewhere

21

in the neighborhood of two years prior to the filing of the

22

homestead lien.

23

As

I'll also find for purposes

Be that as it may, the Court's going to take at

24

least the opportunity to look at Ephraim versus Davis and

25

Sanders versus Sanders to see what it says associated with a
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prejudgment writ of attachment acting as the appropriate lien

2

that might otherwise be reflected in the homestead exemption.

3

So that I might make a determination associated with whether

4

or not a writ of attachment, as you have represented it to be,

5

acts in the case of cutting off any claim for a homestead

6

exemption.

7

that particular issue.

8
9

I'm going to ask Ms. Walton ultimately to look at

So I will give that file to you to check.

I know that

probably gives you, Mr. White, some heartburn associated with

10

under advisement, sine** you and I have a matter that's under

11

advisement that we've been attempting to get in touch with you

12

about on that other matter; Iverson versus Iverson.

13

MR. WHITE: Yes.

14

(Court addresses issue unrelated to this case.)

15

THE COURT: I do understand that it is a matter that is

16

still on my desk and it will be off my desk by the end of this

17

week, as well as this one.

18

arguments today.

19

your materials, because it was well done.

20

So Mr. Miller, I appreciate your

I would also say that I appreciated reading

You've represented yourself better than the lawyer who

21

you asked to represent you, but I held the motion no set aside

22

a judgment, I denied that motion based upon the fact that you

23

had a Counsel representing you.

24

or not communicating with you at that time, he was still a

25

lawyer of record who had also filed an objection to "chis very

Whether he was communicating
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motion, and simply didn't keep you in that particular loop.

2

On the issue associated with the writ of execution,

3

I've taken that issue under advisement, having limited the

4

upper amount of $40,000 to it, to simply whether or not the

5

writ of attachment exists.

6

As to the other property, that property is subject to

7

execution, the smaller parcel, based upon the arguments of

8

Counsel today.

9

having looked at Chugg and Sanders a prejudgment writ of

So the only issue that I have is whether or not

10 I attachment is first in time over a homestead exemption.
11
12

MR. MILLER: Your Honor, what about pertaining to the
exemption for alimony?

13

THE COURT: I've ruled on that.

My ruling is it's

14

not appropriate or applicable based upon the way I read the

15

statute.

Okay, thank you.

16

MR. MILLER: Thank you, your Honor.

17 I

(Hearing concluded.)

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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Addendum 9

m THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN
:
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS, :
MARLENE THOMAS, and the 1995
:
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST,
:
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING
HOMESTEAD EXEMPTION
Case No. 000301127

vs.

:
:
:

GLEN E. MILLER,

:

Judge Randall N. Skanchy

Defendant,

:

This matter came on for hearing on various motions on August 4,2003. Mr.
Douglas F. White representing plaintiffs and Glen E. Miller appearing pro se. After a
review of the pleadings, case law, and argument of the parties, the court finds and orders
as follows:
FINDINGS
1. A prejudgment Writ of Attachment was filed against the real property in
question and was granted on March 26,2001.
2. A judgment was entered on April 10,2003 against Glen Miller in this matter.
3. Lori Miller, the wife of defendant, filed a declaration of homestead on the subject
property on March 26,2003, and she either took occupancy of the property in March or
May of 2003.

-24. A Writ of Execution was issued on May 1,2003, and a sale of the property
subject to execution was scheduled for July 23,2003.
5. Defendant filed a request for hearing on the Writ of Execution and the court
ordered a stay of execution, pending hearing on July 22,2003.

LEGAL DISCUSSION
The court notes that the case of Sanders v. Cassitv. 586 P.2d 423 (Utah 1978) is
dispositive on the issue of whether a homestead exemption may defeat a pre-existing Writ
of Attachment or other judgment on the property claimed under the homestead exemption.
Under the statutory authority of Utah Code Annotated 78-23-1 et. seq., and the Sanders
decision, a homestead exemption may be made at any time after judgment and before sale.
Plaintifrs argument that a prejudgment Writ of Attachment, (or judgment for that matter)
filed before the homestead exemption on the subject property was declared, compromised
the efficacy of the homestead exemption, is as unpersuasive today as it was to the Utah
Supreme Court twenty five years ago. That court opined back then t h a t f l . . . the
homestead exemption is immune from judgment lien, execution or forced sale, providing a
formal declaration of the existing exemption is made prior to the time set for sale or
execution." Id. at 426 (emphasis added). Furthermore, even though the Millers may not
have been in occupancy on the property at the time of the prejudgment Writ of
Attachment, or at the time of judgment, is irrelevant, as the statute neither requires such in
order to declare the exemption and Utah case law recognizes that occupancy is
unnecessary. Rich Cooperative Ass'n v. Dustin, 385 P.2d 155 (Utah 1963)

-3QRDER
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the subject property, 358 North 100
East, Tooele, Utah, is subject to the homestead exemption exercised by the Millers and
exempted up to $40,000.00 per Utah Code Annotated 78-23-3(2)(b)(ii). Mr. White to
prepare the order consistent with this decision.
Dated this

*7

day of August, 2003.

Randall N. STcanchy
District Court Judge

Addendum 10

-1IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

C

JERRY HOUGHTON,

#

Plaintiff,
Case No. 000301127

vs ,

GLEN E. MILLER,
Defendant.

Hearing
Electronically Recorded on
December 4, 2003

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE RANDALL N. SKANCHY
Third District Court Judge

APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff:

DOUGLAS F.
3282 South
Bountiful,
Telephone:

For the Defendant:

JUDSON T. PITTS
(Address not provided)
(Phone number not provided)

Transcribed by: Beverly Lowe, CSR/CCT

1909 South Washington Avenue
Provo, Utah 84606
Telephone: (801) 377-0027

WHITE
Sunset Hollow Dr.
Utah 84010
(435)843-9399

-21

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on December 4 , 2003)

3

THE COURT: All right.

We'll call the matter of

4

Jerry H<Dughton and others versus Glen E. Miller

5

000301127.

6

of appearance.

It is case

Counsel., if you'll come forward, make your entries

7

MR. WHITE: Douglas White for the plaintiff.

8

THE COURT: All right.

9

MR. PITTS: Judson Pitts.

10

THE COURT: Mr. Pitts, this is

11

MR. PITTS: 9946, for the defendant.

12

THE COURT: I think this is your motion.

13

—

So you may

proceed

14

MR. PITTS: Your Honor, at this time, again, with the

15

understanding that I was retained just a little while ago, and

16

I've looked over th e motions, the response to motions, I was

17

unclear as to the scope as to all that would be discussed

18

during the hearing today.
THE COURT: Well, then you're not alone, because so am

19
20

I.

21

MR. PITTS: Okay.

22

THE COURT: But I know that we have voluminous —

I

23

believe what is at issue today is the objection to plaintiff s

24

order.

25

MR. PITTS: Okay.
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THE COURT: But I know there are other motions that

2

have been filed, including a motion or request that I take

3

judicial notice of various items.

4

MR. PITTS: Sure.

5

THE COURT: That may simply be a reflection of somebody

6

trying to practice law who has never been through law school

7

training, but having said that, seemed to have done a pretty

8

good job of representing himself so far.

9

MR. PITTS: Your Honor, I'd like to beg the Court's

10

indulgence at this time for my client that he might have one

11

hand free so that he can take some notes.

12
13

THE COURT: That's not up to me.

That's up to the

officers in the courtroom today.

14

OFFICER: If it's up to us, the answer is no.

15

THE COURT: What I ask is do you have any objection to

16

that?

If you don't, then —

well, let's just do this.

17

free one hand, whichever hand he uses to write with.

Let's

18

MR. MILLER: P-ght.

19

THE COURT: I've always considered the security of the

20

courtroom to be not the province of the Judge but the province

21

of the security officers in the courtroom.

22

MR. PITTS: Your Honor, it appears that my client,

23

the defendant, has issued a motion or made a motion to object

24

to the levy and the execution that has been issued by the

25

plaintiffs in this case, based upon his —

the granting by
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this Court of the homestead exemption back on August 4th, I

2

believe it was, of this year, in that hearing when that came

3

before the Court.

4

make some oral argument about that to clarify our position.

5

We would like at this time to go ahead and

THE COURT: Go ahead, certainly.

6

served by standing at the lectern so that

7

MR. PITTS: (Inaudible).

8

THE COURT: —

9
10

You might best be
—

for purposes of the record it would be

better recorded that way.
MR. PITTS: My client has gone ahead and moved in

11

this case according to the Utah Constitutional provision on

12

homestead, Article 22, Section 1, your Honor, and also pursuant

13

to Utah Code 78-23-3, that the statutory language in that

14

situation be read liberally —

15

him to exclude his homestead.

16

be construed liberally, to allow

Now, I understand there are more than —

there is more

17

than one parcel of land that is involved in this case that he

18

would like to exclude his homestead and also the other parcel

19

of land using various statutory provisions from forced sale and

20

the execution of levy in this case.

21

Your Honor, we would go ahead and enter in argument

22

at this time that the provisions of the code that provide

23

apply to the homestead exemption as it is set forth apply in

24

a setting that is for bankruptcy law.

25

—

We would like to go ahead and move at this time that
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the homestead definition as it is put forth in statutory

2

language should be interpreted differently in this situation,

3

should be distinguished from the context of a bankruptcy

4

proceeding.

5

That the statutory language should be read more

6

liberally to protect the actual physical structure of the

7

homestead in this situation, as differentiated from the

8

bankruptcy.

9

Now, it's my understanding in a bankruptcy proceeding

10

that it is common practice, your Honor, to go ahead and grant

11

the exemption up to $20,000 per person in the household, which

12

would give a total monetary exemption on the homestead of

13

$40,000, and that the rest of the —

14

structure would be subject to a creditor's lien, and would be

15

able to be sold at execution in a sheriff's sale; and that the

16

proceeds from the sale up to $40,000 would be given over to the

17

defendants or the debtors in that situation.

18

the actual physical

We enter an argument at this time that that does

19

not apply in this proceeding.

20

Constitutional proceeding, based on an older law and an older

21

law and an older interpretation of homestead outside of that

22

context of bankruptcy, and that the entire structure at this

23

time is not subject to a forced sale.

24
25

That this proceeding is a

We use case law, your Honor, to back up and to support
our point.

First off I'd like to say Russell M. Miller Company

1

versus Given, the citation in that case, your Honor

2

THE COURT: I have it.

3

MR. PITTS: You have the citation.

—

That exemption

4

statute is to be liberally construed in favor of the debtor

5

to protect he and his family.

6

Folson versus Asper as one of the first cases to deal with

7

homestead at the beginning of this century, that all laws of

8

the homestead should be liberally construed to protect it and

9

make it effective for the dependent and the helpless, to insure

10
11

We also would like to cite

their shelter and their support.
Now, defendant recognizes at this point, your Honor,

12

that the exemption as it was created and cut out has changed

13

over time by legislative change, but we would also like to

14

recognize that the amount —

15

exemption in times past historically have been enough to cover

16

the value of most homesteads.

17

monetary amount of the homestead

As that law has evolved, your Honor, we understand

18

that the price most homesteads in equity has exceeded the

19

value of the homestead exemption for Utah.

20

in a national context that this state has one of the lowest

21

thresholds of any state in the country at this time monetarily

22

for a homestead exemption.

23

I understand

Regardless of that argument, and also recognizing,

24

your Honor, that the homestead exemption law in this state

25

was altered just six years ago in 1996 by the legislature,
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1

that the values were changed, that this was dealt with by the

2

legislature in terms of legislative history, again, the last

3

40 years of homestead law have been almost exclusively caught

4

up in creditor/debtor situations in a bankruptcy proceeding.

5

Now, one of the cases that I wanted to cite as well,

6

your Honor, that I think will help clarify my argument, will

7

be —

8

to take notice of the definition of Black's Law Dictionary on

9

homestead.

well, first off, I wanted to go ahead and ask the Court

That is that the house out-buildings and adjoining

10

land owned and occupied by a person or family as a primary

11

residence, Black's Law Dictionary speaks of the house, the

12

out-buildings, the adjoining land as being a part of the

13

homestead.

14

We argue that when the cases and the statutory

15

language that has been set forth in not only Black's Law

16

Dictionary, but also in the statute 78-23-3, when it talks

17

about a homestead being exempted, we contend that the exemption

18

that that statutory language is talking about isn't the

19

monetary value that is exempted from the forced sale.

20
21
22

THE COURT: If the statute so designates, it's only
exempt up to a certain monetary value.
MR. PITTS: We understand that, but we would like to

23

submit that that is in the bankruptcy proceeding.

We would

24

like to submit that that applies only to bankruptcy cases and

25

it does not apply to situations where a debtor has not filed
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for bankruptcy and is not in the course of liquidating his

2

assets to satisfy all lien creditors that have come against

3

him.

4

THE COURT: Has there been any case in the State of

5

Utah limiting this particular statute only to a bankruptcy

6

proceeding?

7

MR. PITTS: The cases that I have, your Honor, to cite

8

in that context —

of course, the older cases that I've already

9

provided for; Folson and I'd also present McMurray versus Chugg

10

as a case that was not in that context.

11

beneficient purpose of securing and protecting family's home

12

against creditors.

13

Okay.

Now, I would submit to the Court that the

14

language that's used in those cases —

15

of bankruptcy proceeding cases —

16

against attack by creditors.

17

children.

18
19

They talked about the

and these are outside

talk about securing the home

It talks about protecting minor

It talks about giving support to those people.
THE COURT: The statute itself has a cap at which that

protection ends, and that cap is set forth in a monetary value.

20

MR. PITTS: Okay.

Well, Your Honor, the basis of my

21

argument revolves around this being a property interest, as a

22

Constitutional matter, and not being an interest in a monetary

23

value.

24

attaches in this kind of a situation.

25

violation of due process in a Constitutional manner to go ahead

I would like to make the argument that due process
It would be actually a
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and take away the physical home, the physical structure, in

2

granting this exemption.

3

My client and his spouse did apply for a homestead

4

exemption in this case, and in that context they were asking

5

for the monetary relief in that situation, but what my client

6

also moved for in that situation, he moved for the protection

7

of a due process protection.

8

that's given under the United —

9

A Constitutional protection
or the Utah Constitution.

Now, I understand that there is not a Utah case

10

exactly on point in this situation.

11

language in those cases and also through the statutory law

12

that's been given, that it is the physical structure that is

13

protected through due process that he has a right to protect

14

and give shelter to his family and to his minor children that

15

are at home, rather than the money that is associated.

16

It is to be inferred by

It is possible, perhaps, on a forced sale for him to

17

go out and to find a home for his family for $40,000 in this

18

kind of situation, but I'm contending that that's not what the

19

legislative intent —

20

in mind when they passed this Constitutional provision.

21

why if in fact it's Constitutional.

22

not the policy that these legislators had
That's

THE COURT: If I could synthesize your argument,

23

what you're really saying is in the State of Utah under this

24

homestead exemption, if someone claims it, that takes their

25

home, whatever equity, whatever value may exist, and makes it
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free and clear, despite the caps that have been set forth in

2

the statute of any judgment, of any judgment creditor.

3

this is a homestead exemption, it would fly against every

4

debtor/creditor relationship that exists in the state.

If

5

MR. PITTS: You know, your Honor, I

—

6

THE COURT: There is an ability for somebody to say,

7

"My home is my castle, and therefore I may do whatever I'll

8

do to incur debt in whatever fashion I do so, but you can't

9

touch this," and that's what I read these caps to be.

You

10

can't touch it up to $40,000, so that at least somebody can

11

use that exemption for purposes of finding suitable alternative

12

habitation.

13

MR. PITTS: Your Honor, I would

14

THE COURT: No one —

no one —

—
it's not your argument.

15

It sounds like it is.

16

this.

17

creditors if the homestead exemption is declared, and can't be

18

touched whether it has a value of $10,000 or $750,000.

19

It sounds like your argument is simply

A man's home is his castle.

It's exempt from judgment

MR. PITTS: Your Honor, I agree with the Court's

20

summation of my argument with the exception that in the

21

bankruptcy proceeding there are cases that set forth that the

22

exemption that's granted is an allowance for that.

23

words, in that context they are allowed to have $40,000 or

24

$20,000 a person as an exemption, in liquidating all of their

25

other assets.

In other
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McMurty versus Chuggs set forth that the homestead is

2

a benefit to those people to protect that castle.

3

words it's a reward for those debtors and creditors who do not

4

take the steps in filing for bankruptcy.

5

What I'm —

In other

the policy argument that I'm making,

6

your Honor, is that folks who have the integrity, debtors who

7

remain and keep the integrity of not declaring bankruptcy to

8

their creditors, that is a show of good faith on their part,

9

regardless of the circumstances that they would like to go

10
11

ahead and repay their debts.
Now, in my defendant's particular case that might be a

12

lot of debts, your Honor.

I understand you've overseen other

13

cases that my defendant has come before you on, but still

14

THE COURT: I actually haven't seen anything.

15

MR. PITTS: Regardless —

—

regardless of that history,

16

your Honor, he has not taken that step.

17

faith in his situation.

18

as a reward for that, that his wife and his minor children

19

should be granted the opportunity to stay in their home and

20

to not be subject to forced sale, and that the words of the

21

statute should be read as to differentiate between the

22

exemption and the homestead, and that the homestead itself

23

in this situation is a due process Constitutional Right,

24

should be exempt from forced sale.

25

He has shown good

I feel at this time that, you know,

THE COURT: Let me come back and ask this question.

Is
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there any case that you can cite to this Court in the State of

2

Utah that indicates that this exemption merely acts as a lien

3

and the property is not subject, of course, to sale.

4

MR. PITTS: Your Honor, I can submit a case again.

It

5

is an older case because I feel that the cases from the last 50

6

years have all been in the bankruptcy proceeding context, but I

7

do go ahead and cite Kimball versus Salisbury.

8

381-53-P-1037.

9

could find that we support for that position in the

10

It's an 1898 case.

That's 17 Utah

I also believe that you

Folson/Asper case.

11

THE COURT: Okay.

12

MR. WHITE: By way of clarification I believe the

13

Well, let's hear from Mr. White.

defendant's motion is simply to object to the order

—

14

THE COURT: And I understand that, but

—

15

MR. WHITE: —

for the record.

16

THE COURT: —

Mr. Miller hasn't been represented

17

by Counsel, and I'm going to give Counsel latitude to make

18

whatever arguments need to be made, including what this is,

19

is in essence a reconsideration of the Court's prior argument

20

—

21

the fact that he's not been represented.

22

MR. WHITE: Thank you.

or prior ruling.

So give him some latitude here, based upon

I understand Mr. Miller's

23

argument, and I'm looking at the document he submitted on

24

October the 9th, 2003.

25

THE COURT: What's that entitled?
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MR. WHITE: It's entitled, "Request for judicial notice

2

of homestead," which I take as supplemental to his objections

3

to my order.

4

Mr. Miller's idea of protecting the residence, the physical

5

structure from the execution, and to redefine what a homestead

6

is, instead of taking Black's Law, we've got to stick with the

7

statutory definition, which is set forth in Title 78-23

8

THE COURT: Let me just ask a question.

9

In addressing Counsel's argument, and I expect

—

Now, this

Chugg case, McMurty case, and the language associated with

10

those cases all suggest that the homestead exemption exists for

11

purposes of protecting it from being subject to judicial sale.

12

Is this statute a subsequent codification of legislature's

13

issues, intent and otherwise?

14

MR. WHITE: Well, I don't believe —

I think they're

15

mutually exclusive.

I think the case the Court is looking for

16

is here; 19 —

17

that case, which was exactly the same issue being raised here

18

that I researched

the Gilroy case versus Lowe.

I'm citing from

—

19

THE COURT: (Inaudible).

20

MR. WHITE: Exactly, as whether or not the physical

21

structure is safe from the sale as opposed to just the value of

22

the exemption, and here's what the case says.

23

interest in the home therefore exceeds the value of amount of

24

the homestead exemption.

25

circumstances."

"The appellants

A sale is not prohibited in these
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1
2

THE COURT: The appellant in that case was the judgment
creditor?

3

MR. WHITE: Yes.

4

THE COURT: So read that language to me again.

5

MR. WHITE: Pardon?

6

THE COURT: Read that.

7

MR. WHITE: "The appellant was the homestead claimant."

8

THE COURT: Okay.

9

MR. WHITE: The appellant's interest in the home

—

10

and one of the things that probably should have been done is

11

they have some duty to establish what that is.

12

Counsel this morning and by stipulation we're going to submit

13

to the Court the tax assessment, which puts the value at

14

I've marked this as Exhibit 1 —

15

I've talked to

—

$200,099.

Now, the reason for that is somewhat important.

16

Number 1, there is case law that says that if the amount of

17

the homestead exemption is below the value of what might be

18

received out of the house

—

19

THE COURT: You're not able to sell it.

20

MR. WHITE: —

21

THE COURT: That is the one exception.

you're not able to sell it.
That is not the

22

case here.

23

The value of the home, according to that recent tax thing —

24

think that's a little high —

25

ample equity or value in the house to sell it.

The homestead exemption is $40,000; 20 for each.

is over —

is $200,000.

we

There is
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Let me continue with the Gilroy case.

This Court

2

stated that when a claim of homestead is made, a judgment

3

creditor is entitled —

4

value constituting the homestead right.

5

my clients —

to any excess

above the

Furthermore, the homestead exemption is not a bar to

6

execution in the present case.

Assignee Federal Leasing, Inc.

7

bid in $100,000 of the judgment against the appellants and paid

8

to the sheriff on behalf of the appellants the $8,000 that was

9

their homestead exemption.

10

The Court ruled correctly that appellants were not

11

entitled to claim the protection of the homestead exemption

12

to set aside the execution of the sale.

13

This is the ruling.

14

overturned.

15

This is the case.

This is a good case.

It's never been

It's a 1981 case.

The only thing that's been modified in that statute,

16

according to my research, your Honor, is how to calculate what

17

the exemptions were.

18

is simply limited to bankruptcy.

19

I found no case that would say that this

Frankly, even in bankruptcy once the exemption is

20

fixed, the property is abandoned, they sell it, with the

21

proceeds going back into the estate —

22

that, but they're exempt for the creditor.

23

well, I shouldn't say

So even under Counsel's argument of dealing with this

24

differently, that should not work in this Court, because that's

25

not what the law says.
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The physical structure itself is only exempt from

2

execution of sale unless it is worth less than what the

3

exemption amount is, and in this case that is simply not the

4

case.

5

the Court

6
7

Looking at the proposed order that I have submitted to
—
THE COURT: Hang on, let me get that so that I'm

looking at it with you.

8

MR. WHITE: Okay.

9

THE COURT: Order on motion to determine homestead

10
11

exemption; is that what it's entitled?
MR. WHITE: It says, "Order on hearing on writ of

12

execution granting homestead exemption" submitted September 22.

13

Has findings and conclusions on it.

14

THE COURT: I have it.

15

MR. WHITE: Going back a couple of months the defendant

16

submitted some other objections, which frankly a few of those I

17

did incorporate into the current order before the Court, but

18

the last round that he submitted, as far as I can tell, did not

19

address anything further in the order, but rather argued, "You

20

can't sell the structure."

21

right now.

22

So I think that's where we're at

We would ask the Court to sign the order.

I believe

23

it comports with what the Court has said.

Unless Mr. Miller

24

has objections that can state to the Court at this time of why

25

certain paragraphs should not be in there, we would like to get
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this order signed.

2

We believe that my clients are entitled to whatever

3

proceeds there are over $40,000, and when we were here before,

4

Mr. Miller I believe agreed that the other little piece of

5

property was —

6

today it shouldn't be, but the Court ordered it sold before.

7

There was not a homestead on it.

8

relationship, and we would submit it based upon that.

9
10

could be sold.

Now I hear Counsel arguing

That is in the order in that

MR. PITTS: Your Honor, just a few minutes for
rebuttal?

11

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

12

MR. PITTS: The case that Counsel —

plaintiff's

13

Counsel relies on, Gilroy versus Lowe, for setting out the law,

14

we believe in this situation may be distinguished, your Honor.

15

The language that plaintiff's Counsel set before the Court did

16

include the language in this case, in terms of allowing the

17

sale of the home.

18

We believe that in Gilroy versus Lowe there was

—

19

the facts of that case distinguish it f rom this one in that

20

it was brought up entirely as a defense in that situation; the

21

homestead exemption from the sale, and there were no —

22

was no protection.

23

there

There was no family to protect.

The justification in raising the defense wasn't

24

according to the statutory language, and the earlier case law

25

language that held that the reason in a Constitutional setting
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that the home should be protected from forced sale is to

2

protect those of the family that's at home, to allow them to

3

stay there.

4

didn't apply to this situation.

5

We believe that in the Gilroy setting that that

My client is raising this as an argument for his

6

children, for the best interests of his children.

I dare say

7

that in this proceeding that they not only have an interest in

8

this proceeding in terms of this home being sold because of

9

their livelihood, the place where they live.

It's possible

10

that they might be able to find an apartment or they may be

11

able to find some other place to live within the area, but I

12

can't see in this proceeding how the best interests of the

13

children cannot be taken into consideration when looking at the

14

forced sale of this structure.

15

Also, I understand that since a homestead exemption

16

has been granted to the defendant's spouse, the defendant's

17

spouse is not represented here as a part of this proceeding,

18

and under Rule 40 of the Utah Rules of —

19

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure she would be an indispensable

20

party to the order of the forced sale or allowing the execution

21

on this property, because of her interest that's been granted.

22

I'm sorry, 19 of the

In other situations where there is an interest that

23

has been granted, I understand that the procedure used to

24

be that the interest of the defendant had been sold in the

25

property in those situations, but not the actual structure, and
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that the minor children were allowed to live in the structure

2

until the time that they reached the age of majority.

3

those rights come from a Constitutional Right in the property.

4

That's —

5

All of

and that further supports our argument.
Now, in the McMurty versus Chugg that we're relying

6

on also has language, your Honor, that we believe supports

7

and bolsters our point as much as the Gilroy case supports

8

plaintiff's Counsel.

9

In McMurty/Chugg it lays out the language, "The Court

10

rules that the head of a family may assert to prevent sale

11

under execution of his homestead at any time before the sale

12

of the premises, unless the claim against such property has

13

been previously asserted and actually adjudicated against him."

14

In that situation it actually talks, your Honor, and

15

uses language that not just the exemption he may exert against,

16

but he may assert to prevent the sale under execution of the

17

entire structure.

18 I

Your Honor, we really honestly believe in this

19

situation that although this may be a case of first impression

20

before this Court for at least 40 or 50 years, that this is the

21

path that this ought to take.

22

a Constitutional consideration along the due process line for

23

property rights, and should not —

24

those.

25

That this case ought to receive

that homestead falls under

We cite the Kimball case.
We cite the Utah State Constitution, that this is a
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Constitutional creation.

2

money that has evolved and come somehow.

3

Constitution.

4

relationships.

5

We assert that this is a case where we should go back to those

6

roots.

7

Homestead simply isn't a mechanism of
It has its roots in

It doesn't have its roots in creditor/debtor
It doesn't have its roots in bankruptcy law.

That we should go ahead and split the doctrine at this

8

time on homestead.

That there should be a line pertaining to

9

those that declare bankruptcy, and that those are entitled only

10

to keep the exemptions that they claim, and that those who do

11

not declare bankruptcy should be considered outside of that

12

scope, and that there is another body of law that this Court

13

should consider in that situation, and that my defend —

14

the defendant's rights fall in that situation in this case,

15

in order to protect his family, to protect his interest in

16

his property, to protect his minor children in their best

17

interests, and that this Court should not allow the forced

18

sale, but should come up with a more creative solution in this

19

situation that would allow my client, the defendant, to retain

20

possession of his home.

21

THE COURT: All right.

Thank you, Counsel.

that

It appears

22

from the plain reading of the statute that the exemption has a

23

cap, and I see nothing in the order proposed by Counsel that

24

appears objectionable.

25

than really reconsideration of the argument once provided by

Nor have I heard any argument other
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Mr. Miller in some time past associated with exception to the

2

order itself.

3

Certainly the consequences associated with a number

4

of activities that take place in debtor/creditor relationships

5

accrue to the detriment of the parties who have the debt.

6

is one of those circumstances, and the legislature has made

7

clear that that homestead exemption doesn't create an enviable

8

castle, but it creates an enviable castle up to a certain

9

interest amount.

10

This

That interest amount is specifically set forth in the

11

statute, and the Gilroy case seems to be apparent on its face

12

to be applicable to this very case, and that is simply that

13

forced sales may take place of a homestead exemption, with the

14

homestead simply being the amount carved out and any potential

15

equity in the home that's not available for attachment.

16

Accordingly I'll grant the order.

I think I have it

17

here, but if you have a new one, I have one that's in my file

18

and I'll sign it today.

19
20

So this concludes this issue.

MR. WHITE: I only have my copy, your Honor.
think it's an original.

I don't

If not, I'll bring one up today.

21

THE COURT: Well, let's see if it is.

22

MR. PITTS: Your Honor, for the record, defense Counsel

23
24
25

would like to object.
THE COURT: Yeah, I took that by way of your argument
that you were objecting.
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1

MR. PITTS : Sure, I'm just preserving the reco rd, your
Honor.

2

THE COURT

3

I can take this out.

sure th at it' s an original eith er, but —

4
5

All right.

1

of the order.

I'm not

okay, here's a copy

You may certify it or whatever else you need

6

to do with it.

7

value that exists in excess of the homestead exemption.

8

Court's in recess.

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

The Exhibit No. 1 has been received as to the

MR. WHITE: Thank you, your Honor.
(Hearing concluded.)
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DOUGLAS F. WHITE, #3443
Attorney for Plaintiffs
3282 So. Sunset Hollow Drive
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (435) 843-9399
FAX: (435)843-9399

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JERRY HOUGHTON, SUSAN
HOUGHTON, KENDALL R. THOMAS,
MARLENETHOMAS, and the 1995
THOMAS FAMILY TRUST,
Plaintiffs,

)
)
]l
)I

ORDER ON HEARING ON WRIT OF
EXECUTION GRANTING HOMESTEAD
EXEMPTION

]

vs.
)
)

GLEN E. MILLER,

Civil No;i00030H27
Judge Randall Skanchy

Defendant

The Defendant's Motion for Hearing on Writ of Execution before the Honorable Randall N.
Skanchy, Judge, on the 4* day of August, 2003; the Defendant, Glen E. Miller, was personally
''present and represented himself; the Plaintiffs were all personally present and represented by
Douglas F. -White, Attorney; and good cause appearing, therefore the Court enters the following
Order:

1

FINDINGS
1.

A prejudgment Writ of Attachment wasfiledagainst the real property in question and

was granted on March 26,2001.
2.

A judgment was entered on April 10,2003 against Glen E. Miller in this matter.

3.

Lori Miller, the wife of the Defendant, filed a declaration of homestead on the subj ect

property on March 26,2003, and she either took occupancy of the property in March or May of 2003.
4.

AWrit of Execution was issued on May 1,2003; and a sale of the property, subject

to execution, was scheduled for July 23, 2003.
5.

Defendant filed a request for hearing on the Writ of Execution, and the Court ordered

a stay of execution, pending hearing on July 22,2003. The matter was continued until August 4,
2003.
6.

The prejudgment Writ of Attachment was filed against the two (2) real properties at

artime when Defendant did not occupy either property as his residence, nor did any member of his
family.
7.

On March 26,2001, when the prejudgment Writ of Attachment became a lien against

the following described two (2) parcels of real property, the Defendant's and his family's primary
residence was 891 Upland Drive, Tooele, Utah, which is not either of the two (2) real properties
subject to this action:
PARCEL NO. 1:
Beginning 303jeet South of the Northwest Corner of Block 26,
Plat A, Tooele City Survey, running thence East 504 feet; thence South 248 feet;
thence West 9feet; thence North 181.5feet; thence West 495feet; thence North 66.5
2

feet to point of beginning. Containing 0.77 acres. Parcel No. 02-42-14.
PARCEL NO. 2:
Beginning 137 feet West of the Southeast Corner of Lot 5,
Block 41, Plat A, Tooele City Survey, Tooele City, running thence West 196.96 feet;
thence North 43.5 feet; thence East 196.96 feet; thence South 43.5 feet to the point
of beginning. Containing 0.20 acres. Parcel No. 2-57-27.
8.

Defendant was incarcerated in the Utah State Prison on March 27,2002. Thereafter,

Defendant's wife started to repair the uninhabitable house (Parcel No. 1) to live in, and moved in
approximately March ox May of 2003. The prejudgment lien was taken against Parcel No. 1 on
March 26,2001.
9.

Thereafter, Defendant lost his primary residence, that being 891 Upland Drive,

Tooele, Utah*through a mortgage foreclosure in approximately December 2002.
1J0^ " Parcel No. 1, on March 26, 2001, was an old uninhabitable rental house that was
vacant and had had no renters in it for some time.
11.

Parcel No. 2 is vacant ground, has no residence on it, and produces no income or

support to the Defendant's family.
12.

There are no mortgages against either parcel of real property.
LEGAL CONCLUSIONS

v13.

The prejudgment Writ of Attachment, filed on March 26, 2001, is defeated by the

filing of a homestead declaration on March 26,2003.
lC

The amount of homesteacLexemption is $20,000.00 for Glen E. Miller and $20,000.00

for Lori L. Miller, pursuant to Section 78-23-3(2), U.C.A. as against Parcel No. 1.
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12.

Parcel No. 2 has no homestead exemption.

13.

The Plaintiffs shall renotice the Sheriffs Sale, which was previously stayed by the

Court, and proceed with the sale of both parcels of real property, subject to this Order.
DATED this j^£_ day of J lu^hm

2003.
BY THE COURT

RANDALL SKANCHT
Judge

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT

TO:

GLEN E. MILLER
Pursuant to Rule 4.504 of the Code of Judicial Administration, you are hereby notified the

undersigned will hold the original hereof for a period of five (5) days from the date this notice is
mailed to you to allow you sufficient time to file any written objections to the form of the foregoing
with the Court and mail a copy to the undersigned. If no objections to the form are filed within that
time, the original hereof will be submitted to the Court for signature and filing.
I do hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, on

4

this 22nd day of September, 2003, to the following person(s):
Glen E. Miller, USP No. 33042
Defendant
Utah State Prison
P. O. Box 250
Draper, Utah 84020

ItB&41

SON, Legal Assistant

5

Addendum 12

ear Built :

:

Building Type : : • Square Footage : 0 :

—story D e s c r i p t i o n :

' * * SPECIAL NOTE * * *

?axes R a t e s f o r 2 0 0 1 have NOT'ESeiv j e t o r approved? Any t a x e s - l e v i e d
shown on t h i s p r i n t o u t f o r t h e y e a r - 2 0 0 1 a r e subject tcy change*!!
L e g a l D e s c r i p t i o n f o r 02-042-0-0014
Dax Rate : 0 . 0 1 1 9 5 9 : N" 100 E: 358 TOOELE TfiSKER' 01/05/2000
3E(5 303 FT S OF THE NW COR BLK 26, PLAT "A, TCS, RUN TH E 504 FT; TH S 248
?T; TH W 9 FT; TH N 181.5" FT; TH W 4 9 5 ^ ; TH N 66.5 FT TO POB, COMB T-504 &
r - 5 0 4 - 1 0.77 AC

